CSD*Bulletin*

The Conduct of War

Barry Buzan *asks whether people get the governments they deserve*

NATO's air war against Serbia in 1999 once again pushed forward the idea that war can and should be made against wicked leaders but not against the peoples that such leaders rule. The heart of this problem is how to understand the relationship between peoples and their governments as a basis for legitimizing the use of force against them.

Encouraged by the availability of precision-guided weapons, the idea that, in war, peoples and their governments should be treated separately has become something of a Western fetish. Thinking this way appears to inject an element of civilized humanitarianism into the traditionally bloody business of war. But whatever its humanitarian merits, it has profound effects on Western military tactics and strategy, squeezing it into stringently limited forms of warfare. It forces the West into the curious posture, seen also in the war against Iraq, of worrying almost as much about enemy casualties as about its own. The contrast with the attitude of the Serbian and Iraqi militaries towards their enemy populations could not be more striking. Nor could the contrast with Western attitudes during the Second World War, when the dictates of total war, combined with the limits of military technology, justified the carpet bombing, and eventually the nuclear incineration, of whole cities.

Underlying these sharply contrasting attitudes is a single question: 'Do peoples get the governments they deserve?' During the First and Second World Wars, the Western answer to this question was by and large 'yes'. This understanding legitimized mass destruction attacks, and explains both the forced political remaking of Japan and Germany under occupation regimes, and the very long political hangovers that still affect their positions in international society. Up until the early 1990s, apartheid South Africa was also partly treated in this way, where the white population was broadly associated with a racist government, and collectively subjected to international pressure. During the Cold War, there was much more ambivalence, and a stronger tendency to answer the question 'no'. The populations of Eastern Europe definitely, and that of the Soviet Union more arguably, could be seen as victims of a ruthless revolutionary coup, and thus as prisoners of their own governments. This attitude was more difficult to take towards China, Vietnam and Cuba, all of which had communist governments brought to power by successful mass revolutions, and in Vietnam there was not much concern to differentiate the people of the North from their government. After the Cold War, the West seems to be drifting towards the idea that the answer is generally 'no', that peoples do not deserve, and are not responsible for, the governments they get. There are some exceptions, perhaps

most conspicuously in American attitudes towards the Islamic revolution in Iran. But from North Korea, through Burma, Iraq, and Libya, and now to Serbia, the West is informing its policy by separating bad governments from their people.

We need to ask two questions about this. First, is it correct to make this assumption? Secondly, whether or not it is correct, is it good policy to do so? Separating peoples from their governments has the advantage of inviting the overthrow of tyrants from within, and keeps open the option of a country remaking itself and gaining quick re-entry into the international community. But its cost is that it constrains the sort of military pressure that can be brought to bear, and may be useless if the country remains politically unreconstructed and thus a continuing danger.

It is pretty easy to establish the ends of the yes-no spectrum about whether people deserve the governments they get. In well-rooted democracies, with traditions of individual rights, a broad franchise, and regular elections, people clearly do deserve their governments, whether they bother to vote or not. This covers countries from India to Israel, from Norway to New Zealand, and from Canada to South Korea. At the other end of the spectrum are countries such as those in Eastern Europe under Soviet occupation during the Cold War, where governments are imposed by a dominating outside power. Peoples in this condition cannot be held responsible for their governments. The middle of the spectrum gets more complicated. Just behind the democracies come countries where mass revolutionary regimes command widespread popular support or acquiescence. These would include communist China and Cuba, Islamic Iran, and Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In the middle of the spectrum come countries with authoritarian regimes that do not command mass support, but which do enjoy mass acquiesence. Nigeria, Brazil and Argentina under military rule might fit this picture. Between the middle and the do-not-deserve end of the spectrum one finds countries with oppressive domestic governments where substantial sections of the population have put up active resistance but failed to unseat the regime. Burma is the obvious example here, as in some ways is Iraq.

There are some difficult cases. How can we tell whether the North Korean regime has mass support/acquiescence, or is just peculiarly efficient at repression? What does one do with split countries, where the government is supported by one section of the population and actively opposed by another, as in Israel, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Turkey? And if one pushes deeper, questions need to be asked about the more general relationship between types of society and their governments. In countries with strong structures of tribe and clan, such as Congo, Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, the choice seems to be between harsh dictatorships and political disintegration. It is far from clear that either Libya or Iraq would end up with a different type of leadership than the ones they now have if Gadaffi and Saddam Hussein were removed. This leads to another question: do peoples have responsibility for the state they inhabit, which often determines (or at least shapes strongly) the type of government they get? Clearly 'yes' in self-made states that have evolved over long periods. Perhaps not, or less so, in some externally constructed post-colonial states such as Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, and Syria, with shallow traditions and artificial borders. And deeper still - do peoples get the societies and cultures they deserve: Islamic, Hindu, Christian, Buddhist, Jewish and suchlike? The answer has to be broadly 'yes', inasmuch as people actively reproduce them and identify themselves as belonging to them. If cultural values are correlated with authoritarian values, as is often said of the Islamic and East Asian worlds, then there is some link of responsibility connecting people, culture and government.

These are tough questions, but answers to them have to be found if ideas about humanitarian intervention are ever to acquire intellectual and political coherence. If force is going to be used against a country in pursuit of civilisational objectives, these questions have not only to be asked, but also answered clearly before appropriate military strategies can be devised. Baldly put, if people do deserve the government they get, and if that government is in gross breach of standards of civilization, then, as in the Second World War, there need be fewer moral concerns about restraints on the use of force. If a government reflects its people, and is pursuing policies unacceptable to basic human rights, then the war must and should be against both government and people. At the other end of the spectrum, if the people do not deserve the government they get, then military strategy must be devised as much as possible to target the government but not the people.

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Social Justice and Identity Politics

Nancy Fraser *argues that justice requires both redistribution and recognition*

Claims for social justice seem today increasingly to divide into two types: first, redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and goods. Egalitarian redistributive claims have supplied the paradigm case for most theorizing about social justice for the past 150 years. Secondly, claims for recognition. Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect. This type of claim has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers, some of whom are seeking to develop a new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at its centre.

The two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one another. The result is a widespread decoupling of the cultural politics of difference from the social politics of equality. In some cases, this dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of redistribution reject the politics of recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as 'false consciousness', a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely, some proponents of recognition see distributive politics as part and parcel of an outmoded materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with many injustices. In such cases, we are effectively presented with an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? class politics or identity politics? multiculturalism or social democracy?

These are false antitheses. Justice today requires both redistribution and recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two para-

digms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive account of justice.

Of the moral-theoretical questions that arise when we contemplate doing this, three are especially important. First, is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization? Secondly, do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis*, normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? And, thirdly, does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?

In answer to the first question: I consider recognition to be an issue of justice. Doing this has several advantages. First, it permits one to justify claims for recognition as morally binding under modern conditions of value pluralism. Under these conditions, there is no single conception of self-realization that is universally shared, nor any that can be established as authoritative. Secondly, it conceives misrecognition as a status injury whose locus is social relations, not individual psychology. Finally, the justice account of recognition avoids the view that everyone has an equal right to social esteem. That view is patently untenable, because it renders meaningless the notion of esteem.

Does it follow - turning now to the second question - that distribution and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis* conceptions of justice? Or can either of them be reduced to the other? The question of reduction must be considered from two different sides. From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of distributive justice can adequately subsume problems of recognition. In my

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view, the answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over and above the allocation of resources and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists assume a reductive economistic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition.

What, then, of the other side of the question? Can existing theories of recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here, too, the answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appreciate the importance of economic equality and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But once again the results are not wholly satisfactory. Such theorists tend to assume a reductive culturalist view of distribution.

In general, then, neither distribution theorists nor recognition theorists have so far succeeded in adequately subsuming the concerns of the other. Thus, instead of endorsing either one of their paradigms to the exclusion of the other, I develop a two-dimensional conception of justice. This conception treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice. Without reducing either one of them to the other, it encompasses both dimensions within a broader, overarching framework.

PARITY OF PARTICIPATION

The normative core of my conception is the notion of parity of participation. According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible at least two conditions must be satisfied. First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and 'voice'. Secondly, the institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation must express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. Both these conditions are necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The first brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice, especially those pertaining to the economic structure of society and to economically defined class differentials. The second one brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the philosophy of

recognition, especially those pertaining to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Thus, a two-dimensional conception of justice oriented to the norm of participatory parity encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other.

PRAGMATISM

This brings us to the third question: does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, over and above the recognition of our common humanity? This question cannot be answered by an a priori account of the kinds of recognition that everyone always needs. It needs, rather, to be approached in the spirit of pragmatism as informed by the insights of a critical social theory. From this perspective, recognition is a remedy for injustice, not the satisfaction of a generic human need. Thus, the form(s) of recognition justice requires in any given case depend(s) on the form(s) of misrecognition to be redressed.

This pragmatic approach overcomes the liabilities of decontextualized views. First, it eschews the claim, espoused by some distributive theorists, that justice requires limiting public recognition to those capacities all humans share. That approach dogmatically forecloses recognition of what distinguishes people from one another, without considering whether the latter might be needed in some cases to overcome obstacles to participatory parity. Secondly, the pragmatic approach eschews the opposite claim, equally decontextualized, that everyone always needs their distinctiveness recognized.

For the pragmatist, accordingly, everything depends on precisely what currently misrecognized people need in order to be able to participate as peers in social life. And there is no reason to assume that all of them need the same thing in every context. In some cases, they may need to be unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness. In other cases, they may need to have hitherto underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or advantaged groups, outing the latter's distinctiveness, which has been falsely parading as universality. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct the very terms in which attributed differences are currently elaborated. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the above, in com-

bination with one another and in combination with redistribution. Which people need which kind(s) of recognition in which contexts depends on the nature of the obstacles they face with regard to participatory parity. That, however, can only be determined with the aid of a critical social theory.

SINGLE FRAMEWORK

This brings us to the social-theoretical issues that arise when we try to encompass redistribution and recognition in a single framework. Here, the principal task is to theorize the relations between class and status, and between maldistribution and misrecognition, in contemporary society. An adequate approach must allow for the

full complexity of these relations. It must account both for the differentiation of class from status and for the causal interactions between them. It must accommodate, as well, both the mutual irreducibility of maldistribution and misrecognition and their practical entwinement with one another.

Consider an ideal-typical pre-state society of the sort described in the classical anthropological literature, while bracketing the question of ethnographic accuracy. In such a society, the master idiom of social relations is kinship. Kinship organizes not only marriage and sexual relations, but also the labor process and the distribution of goods; relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. In such a society, class structure and status order are effectively fused. Because kinship constitutes the overarching princi-

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ple of distribution, kinship status dictates class position. Status injuries translate immediately into (what we would consider to be) distributive injustices. Misrecognition directly entails maldistribution.

Now consider the opposite extreme of a fully marketized society, in which economic structure dictates cultural value. In such a society, the master determining instance is the market. Markets organize not only the labour process and the distribution of goods, but also marriage and sexual relations; political relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. In this society, too, class structure and status order are effectively fused. But the determinations run in the opposite direction. Because the market constitutes the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position dictates social status. In the absence of any quasi-autonomous cultural value patterns, distributive injustices translate immediately into status injuries. Maldistribution directly entails misrecognition.

In both of these societies, accordingly, (what we would call) class and status map perfectly onto each other. For the fully kin-governed society, one can read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural; one can infer class directly from status and maldistribution directly from misrecognition. For the fully marketized society, conversely, one can read off the cultural dimension of domination directly from the economic; one can infer status directly from class and misrecognition directly from maldistribution. For understanding the forms of domination proper to the fully kin-governed society, therefore, culturalism is a perfectly appropriate social theory. If, in contrast, one is seeking to understand the fully marketized society, one could hardly improve on economism.

When we turn to other types of societies, however, such simple and elegant approaches no longer suffice. They are patently inappropriate for our own society, which contains both marketized arenas, in which strategic action predominates, and non-marketized arenas, in which value-oriented interaction predominates. As a result, one cannot read off the economic dimension of domination

directly from the cultural, nor the cultural directly from the economic. Likewise, one cannot infer class directly from status, nor status directly from class. Finally, one cannot deduce maldistribution directly from misrecognition, nor misrecognition directly from maldistribution. It follows that neither culturalism nor economism suffices for understanding capitalist society. Instead, one needs an approach that can accommodate differentiation, divergence, and interaction at every level.

SUBSTANTIVE DUALISM

What sort of social theory can handle this task? If neither economism nor culturalism is up to the task, a dualism of some sort is required. But everything depends on what sort. Two possibilities present themselves. The first I call 'substantive dualism'. This treats redistribution and recognition as two different 'spheres of justice', with the former pertaining to the economic domain of society, the latter to the cultural domain. When we consider economic matters, such as the structure of labor markets, we should assume the standpoint of distributive justice, attending to the impact of economic structures and institutions on the relative economic position of social actors. When we consider cultural matters, such as the representation of female sexuality on MTV, we should assume the standpoint of recognition, attending to the impact of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and value on the status and relative standing of social actors.

Substantive dualism may be preferable to economism and culturalism, but it is nevertheless inadequate. Treating economy and culture as two separate spheres, it mistakes the social differentiations for institutional divisions that are impermeable and sharply bounded. The economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and -resignifying one. What presents itself as 'the economy' is always already permeated with cultural interpretations and norms–witness the distinctions between 'working' and 'caregiving', 'men's jobs' and 'women's jobs', which are so fundamental to historical capitalism. Likewise, what presents itself as 'the cultural sphere' is deeply permeated by 'the bottom line'– witness global mass entertainment, the art market, and transnational advertising, all fundamental to contemporary culture.

Substantive dualism is not a solution to, but a symptom of, the current uncoupling of redistribution and recognition. A critical perspective, in contrast, must probe the connections between them. It must make visible, and criticizable, both the cultural subtexts of nominally economic processes and the economic subtexts of nominally cultural practices. It must assume both the standpoint of distribution and the standpoint of recognition, without reducing either one of these perspectives to the other.

PERSPECTIVAL DUALISM

Such an approach I call 'perspectival dualism'. Here redistribution and recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal domains, economy and culture. Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives that can be assumed with respect to any domain. These perspectives can be deployed critically, moreover, against the ideological grain. One can use the recognition perspective to identify the cultural dimensions of what are usually viewed as redistributive economic policies. By focusing on the production and circulation of interpretations and norms in welfare programs, for example, one can assess the effects of institutionalized maldistribution on the identities and social status of single mothers. Conversely, one can use the redistribution perspective to bring into focus the economic dimensions of what are usually viewed as issues of recognition. By focusing on the high 'transaction costs' of living in the closet, for example, one can assess the effects of heterosexist misrecognition on the economic position of gays and lesbians.

To apply this approach, take the example of comparable worth. Here a claim to redistribute income between men and women is expressly integrated with a claim to change gender-coded patterns of cultural value. The underlying premise is that gender injustices of distribution and recognition are so complexly intertwined that neither can be redressed entirely independently of the other. Thus, efforts to reduce the gender wage gap cannot fully succeed if, remaining wholly 'economic', they fail to challenge the gender meanings that code low-paying service occupations as 'women's work', largely devoid of intelligence and skill. Likewise, efforts to revalue female-coded traits such as interpersonal sensitivity and nurturance cannot succeed if, remaining wholly 'cultural', they fail to challenge the structural economic conditions that connect those traits with dependency and powerlessness. Only an approach that redresses the cultural devaluation of the 'feminine' precisely within the economy (and elsewhere) can deliver serious redistribution and genuine recognition.

Perspectival dualism in social theory complements participatory parity in moral theory. Together, these two notions constitute a portion of the conceptual resources one needs to begin answering the key political question of our day: how can one develop a coherent programmatic perspective that integrates redistribution and recognition? How can one develop a framework that integrates what remains cogent and unsurpassable in the socialist vision with what is defensible and compelling in the apparently 'postsocialist' vision of multiculturalism?

If we fail to ask this question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and misleading either/or dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social arrangements that can redress both economic and cultural injustices. Only by looking to integrative approaches that unite redistribution and recognition can we meet the requirements of justice.

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The Limits of Independence

Adam Watson _analyses the new collective hegemony_

Conventional theory holds that the present international system consists of independent states. These states are being forced into greater interdependence by a tightening net of impersonal pressures (trade, technology, weaponry, ecology). To manage their interdependence, these states have consciously established rules and institutions - such as the United Nations - that constitute a society. This anarchical society assumes that (almost) every group desiring independent statehood should have it; that there should be no overarching authority or interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and that they are all morally and juridically equal.

These assumptions are becoming increasingly absurd. The most powerful states have 10,000 times the authority of small mini or quasi states dependent on outside help to manage the pressures of the modern world. In fact, the core states today jointly exercise a collective hegemonial authority in the system.

In 1988, a conference in Holland asked: 'Does the combination of postmodern states at the core and failed states at the periphery point to the emergence of a new international system?' My answer is yes. This is an alternative description of collective hegemony.

In the nineteenth century, the Concert of Europe was effective because it included all the great powers. It recognized their obligation to put pressure on smaller states, both in and outside Europe, to observe European standards of civilization. The great powers did not always agree; but they accepted the principles of joint responsibility and concerted action.

An agreement for the collective suppression of the slave trade was included in the peace settlement after the defeat of Napoleon. In 1833 the British House of Commons proclaimed that in India the interests of Indians took priority over those of Europeans; and other colonial powers accepted similar obligations. The Mandate and Trusteeship provisions of the League of the Nations and the UN subjected to international supervision the responsibilities of great powers to both bring certain non-European states to self-government. The League also made the strong powers collectively responsible for the strategic security of the weak. A new system, with a concert of great powers at its core and other states in a periphery, took shape in practice within the rules and institutions of multiple independences.

A hundred years ago, the nineteenth century concert petered out into two great 'hot' wars and the Cold War. The energies of the great powers were directed against each other. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the energies of the great powers are again directed towards managing the international system in concert.

The wholesale decolonization after World War II was hailed as the fulfilment of the principle of universal independence. Membership of the UN rose to three times its original number. But the proliferation of nominal independences strained that principle to bursting point.

Decolonization was largely successful in Asia with the long civilized Asian societies now resuming their position of technological, economic and cultural equality with the West. But elsewhere - Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania - independence was given to many small states that cannot stand on their own feet.

The core powers recognize that the days of unilateral colonialism are over, but also that a general - and, in practice, permanent - collective substitute for colonial management is necessary. A complex, patchy, but inclusive system of collective economic security has developed, with half the states in the world now defended and partly paid for by the hegemonial core.

A great power is not a status but a fact, with obligations and rights recognized by other states. The great powers today are the five permanent members of the Security Council (America, China, Britain, France, and Russia) plus the Group of Eight which includes Germany and Japan.

What matters in collective hegemony is the relations between the concert powers. They and other core states are in continuous dialogue on many subjects; and they recognize a linkage or trade-off between problems. They may not always agree, but dissenters nonetheless acquiesce in practice. The concert is elastic enough to let its members play different roles. As part of their bargaining, the great powers accept compromises and tailor their actions to each other. The concert thus pulls their policies towards alignment, and so limits the independence of its members, as well as of course the independence of peripheral states. But all governments portray themselves as acting more independently and morally than is really the case.

Today's collective hegemony has three main aims:

1. Peace making and keeping is occasional and localized, mainly concerned with civil warfare and ethnic cleansing in peripheral states. Military operations can cost the concert powers blood as well as money. Non-intervention, once a cornerstone of international order, is now condemned as the failure of the core to meet its international responsibilities.

2. The core states need a healthy global economy. To maintain it, the core provides worldwide co-ordinated help to the periphery, both directly and through international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Economic aid is largely successful. The core operates a centrifuge to the periphery, providing material goods or money to buy them, technology and know-how, and markets in core economies for goods from the periphery. More than half the transfer of resources is private, and therefore involved benefits to both parties.

3. In return, the mainly Western donors demand the observance of their standards of civilization - human rights, democracy,

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social justice, and the environment. These standards are difficult for many peripheral states, where the practical alternatives are firm government or chaos. Nevertheless, peripheral governments increasingly observe Western standards as the price of aid. As the influence of the great Asian powers - China, Japan, India - in the concert grows, the concert's standards of civilisation will become less exclusively Western.

Today's collective hegemony makes the world more integrated, safer, and less anarchic. It limits the freedom of action of all states, even the largest. But its practice outruns conventional theory. It needs legitimacy, especially in peripheral states whose independence is a recently won status.

Collective hegemony gains legitimacy by adopting programmes that appeal to popular aspirations in the periphery. It must use its resources to help ensure safety and prosperity; and it must also aim at certain individual rights and freedoms. If the concert powers consistently do so, they are capable of becoming the joint trustees and executors of a general will of mankind.

The concert must also legitimize its hegemony by preserving a generous degree of symbolic independence for small, weak states. These have a limited scope of jurisdiction, a sovereign autonomy in an integrated world system. They will retain the symbols of independence - the flag, the embassies, the seat at the UN. If present practices continue, some like Haiti and Bosnia will operate under collective policing; but most will govern increasingly on lines demanded by their publics and the concert, with resources substantially generated in the core.

Collective hegemony has not always been, and will not always be, wise or successful. But to understand it, we must recognise that nothing else is available. If an upsurge of donor fatigue, moral indifference, and protectionism in the core removed all hegemonial pressures, inducements and aid, then prosperity, human rights, and peace and order would sharply decline. The periphery would become poorer and more dangerous. But if hegemonial pressures and aid continue, the core might develop into a supranational authority. Hegemony and the limits of independence therefore require careful study.

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The Genealogy of Despotism

Rafik Bouchlaka *traces the history of a key term in Western political thought*

In Hellenic discourse the term *despotes* (master) was closely associated with *oikonomos* (household management) and it referred primarily to the role of the patriarch who controlled household life. The despot is the father of the family, and his power is seen as despotic in relation only to his slaves, not his wife or children. In the Hellenic view, this relationship is deeply entrenched in the human condition. Aristotle argues that it is legitimate to have slaves as they lack all human qualities. Barely more than animals, slaves are to be exploited as living tools, as objects for use in the household. This treatment is self-evidently legitimate, for slaves (having little capacity for judgement) accept their domination by the despot.

Aristotle distinguishes between four forms of power: the power of the magistrate, of the king, of the father of a family, and of a master. Only the first three involve free people and so may be classified as political relations. The fourth, however, is the power a free man has over a human being deprived of freedom and is despotic power.

Aristotle applies the term 'despotic rule' to contexts where political power is analogous to that of a master over his slaves. He treats despotism as a type of kingship where the power of the monarch over his subjects, although

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indistinguishable from that exercized by a master over his slaves, is seen by the ruled as sanctified by custom and hence legitimate. This type of rule is characteristic of non-Hellenes or barbarians (whom the Greeks regarded as slaves by nature). To the Greeks, who perceived themselves as rational agents, despotism was profoundly repulsive.

The term *despotes*, therefore, has a political application only by analogy. In his *Politics* Aristotle clarifies the basis of this shift from a private to a public application of the term, from the realm of the household to the sphere of politics, or *praxis*, where public debate takes place and men assert their essential identity as 'political animals'. Aristotle only uses the term 'despotic government' - by analogy, as we have seen, with slavery in domestic relations - in order to designate those governments which no longer conform to the principle of 'absolute justice'. Thus he sees tyranny as a deviation from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from republic. All these types of government are deemed despotic because their rulers - like the household master - seek their own interests, though these may accidentally benefit their subjects. Tyranny 'has no regard for any public interest which does not also serve the tyrant's own advantage. The aim of the tyrant is his own pleasure'.

Aristotle certainly distinguishes

between kingship and tyranny. Nevertheless, he legitimizes tyranny as a political necessity founded on natural necessity. In his view, the two forms of government - kingship and tyranny - are different manifestations of despotism. This may appear to be a contradiction: on the one hand, a distinction between tyranny and kingship and a designation of the latter as the best form of government; on the other hand, a characterization of the two as divergent forms of government. This apparent contradiction is explained by Aristotle's contention that different forms of government are perpetually wavering between the best and the worst type of rule.The various types of government are linked together by analogy. The model of the despotic master who rules by nature is applicable to both kingship and tyranny. Kingship never exists as pure political power, neither does tyranny ever exist as complete despotism. Political regimes continually waver between kingship and tyranny, between perfection and degradation. It is, indeed, on the basis of this contention that Aristotle deems aristocracy the best possible form of government since it represents a middle way between tyranny and monarchy.

In the Hellenic-Persian wars Greeks used 'despotism' to designate the political conditions of Persians and 'other Asian peoples'. They were considered 'barbarian', with no potential to engage in reasoned public debate; they could, thus, legitimately be treated as slaves. In the Greek view, Asians desire despotism by nature. This is despotism in the proper sense, not by analogy, as is the case among Greeks. Asians are incapable of constructing a public sphere and must remain eternally in domestic relations 'the assumption being that barbarians and slaves, by nature are one and the same'. The fate of Asians must therefore necessarily be in the hands of the Greeks.

FROM MACHIAVELLI TO MONTESQUIEU

Modern Europe reinvented the old fiction of 'Asiatic despotism' as it had been conceived by Aristotle. Since the Renaissance, political thinkers and philosophers have tended to define the character of their political and cultural world by contrasting it with that of the Turkish order: so close, yet infinitely remote. There is a long tradition -

prompted by the proximity of Turkish power - of theoretically juxtaposing and contrasting European and Asian state structures. This practice is coeval with the birth of modern political theory in the Renaissance.

Machiavelli - in early sixteenth-century Italy - was the first theorist to use the Ottoman state as the antithesis of European monarchy. In two central passages of *The Prince*, he describes the autocratic bureaucracy of The Porte as an institutional order which is different from those of all the states of Europe. 'The entire Turkish empire is ruled by one master and all other men are his servants, he divides his kingdom into Sandjaks and dispatches various administrators to govern them, whom he transfers and changes at his pleasure. They are all slaves bounded to him.'

The revival of the term 'despotism' began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes: their writings centred on the issue of absolutism, which they sometimes called despotism. Bodin contrasted monarchies (bound by respect for the persons and goods of their subjects) with empires (unrestricted in their

> 'Since the Renaissance, political thinkers and philosophers have tended to define the character of their political and cultural world by contrasting it with that of the Turkish order: so close, yet infinitely remote.'

dominance over their subjects). The first were represented by the 'royal sovereignty' of the European state; the second was the 'lordly' power of despotism, such as that of the Ottoman state, which was essentially foreign to modern Europe.

It was not until the eighteenth century, in the writings of Montesquieu, that the concept of despotism became significant in Western political discourse. It replaced the concept of tyranny as the term most often used to designate a system of total domination. Montesquieu's political philosophy was part of a long tradition which had its roots in the Hellenic era. The use of the term 'despotism' reflected this line of continuity.

Despotism, according to Montesquieu, is the rule of a single person who is subject to no restraint, constitutional or moral. Montesqieu depicts despotic rule as one grounded in the ruler's caprices and passions. Unlike legitimate rulers, the despot must depend on fear as the guiding principle in the whole system. Montesquieu's main strategy in developing the concept of despotism is to shed light on the political condition of modernity. Montesquieu's Europe is one in which monarchies incline to absolutism and tend to centralize power. He writes about Asian regimes in order to establish analogies with the political condition of

modern Europe and to draw conclusions about the destiny of these monarchies.

The affinities between Montesquieu's thought and Aristotle's are two-fold. First, in Greek discourse, 'despotism' - as we have seen - refers to a type of relationship in the household, but one which - in the form of the master–slave relationship - can also be found in public life. From the sixteenth century, and in advanced form in the eighteenth century in Montesquieu's writings, a semantic reversal takes place, one which heralds the 'politicization' of the domestic sphere: it is not the domestic sphere which provides the model for thinking about the political sphere, but vice versa. When Rousseau speaks of the 'unique despotism of fathers', he is using the political concept metaphorically.

A case can be made for reading Montesquieu's definition of despotism as an attempt to describe those aspects of absolutist power which threatened to depict public life in terms of the master–slave relationship predominant in the domestic sphere. Montesquieu's political thought can be understood not as a complete shift from Aristotelianism, but, rather, as a kind of revival and inversion of it.

Secondly, for Montesquieu, 'despotism' refers to to a discursive order of power relevant to Asian society. This order corresponds exactly to the geographical and conceptual conditions of Aristotle's 'other'. Since the fifteenth century, when Constantinople fell into Muslim hands, the Ottoman Empire had been installed at the gates of Europe. In the reflections of European thinkers and philosophers from the fifteenth century the Turk is both the the enemy next door and culturally remote and alien. By the eighteenth century, in the wake of colonial exploration and expansion, the ideas initially applied to Turkey had spread steadily further East to Persia, then India, and finally to China.

In Montesquieu's analysis Asia appears as the natural repository of despotism. It is clear that Montesquieu subscribes to Aristotle's views about the political nature of Asians. Aristotle deems slavery a natural phenomenon, while Montesquieu condemns all forms of slavery as unnatural. He does not do so, however, in the case of Asian societies, where 'physical nature' itself is appealed to in order to explain the slavery that he dismisses as unnatural and excessively unjust to European man.

DE TOCQEVILLE

Tocqueville's conception of despotism shattered the notion that the imagined alternative to modern democracy was embodied in an external other, the Orient, the embodiment of despotism. Tocqueville foresaw the possibility of modern democracy turning *on its own* into a new kind of oppression, though one to which he could not give a proper name. 'I seek in vain for an expression that will accurately convey the idea I have formed of it. The old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate: the thing itself is new, and since I cannot name it I must attempt to describe it.'

The 'new despotism' - as Tocqueville puts it - has no historical precedent. It is difficult - according to Tocqueville - clearly to identify this sort of despotism when modern democracy has based its legitimacy on having demolished the despotism of the aristocratic period; modern democratic societies no longer feel threatened by despotism because the dominion of that old form of government over its subjects is being broken.

> 'Tocqueville's conception of despotism shattered the notion that the imagined alternative to modern democracy was embodied in an external other.'

Tocqueville argues that the new form of despotism is softer and less visible than that of the *ancien régimes.* Nevertheless, although despotism in modern democracy does not torment its subjects, it does degrade them ('il degradait les hommes sans les tourmenter'). The hands and eyes of the state infiltrate daily life more and more and, 'in the name of democratic equality, government becomes regulator, inspector, advisor , educator and punisher of social life'. In this sense the nation becomes nothing but a 'herd of timid and industrial animals of which the government is the shepherd' ('un troupeau d'animaux timide et industrieux dont le gouvernement est le berger').

According to Tocqueville, the establishment of a democratic system has had two effects. On the one hand, the value of the individual is fully recognized; and this is bound up with the 'the wish to remain free'. On the other hand, the individual is subjugated to a sovereign power. Tocqueville calls this 'social power' and associates it with the need to be led. The main paradox of modern democracy lies in the fact that individuals feel the need to be driven and, at the same time, wish to be free. They want a single, strong authority over them, but one controlled and directed by free citizens.

Tocqueville maintains that the ideals of equality and social justice are not synonymous with those of liberty, but can contradict them: the two notions should be carefully distinguished. Tocqueville maintains that, in a modern democracy, people tend to replace the ideal of freedom with the goal of state-secured equality. In an egalitarian society, every individual is naturally isolated, and is 'protected' neither by family nor by his social class. The individual is easily cast aside, and trodden on mercilessly. It is, indeed, strange, Tocqueville argues, that it is people living in a democracy who have, for the first time in history, introduced the notion of freedom into political discourse and opened the door to a new form of despotism.

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CSD Interview

Keeping Tabs on Power

John Keane *discusses hubris, civil society, and the role of political theory*

How did you become interested in political theory?

The old maxim that political thinking is best stimulated by crises certainly applies to me. As a teenager, I had had a science background: I wanted to be either a geologist or a meteorologist. But in my first year at university - in Adelaide - I was drafted to fight in Vietnam. I watched all Australia go into a paroxysm of bitter dispute about the war, dragging me into a personal, family, and political crisis, and forcing me for the first time to think politically. I battled against the draft, was rewarded with a fine for refusing to attend medicals and threatened with prison, and helped the successful campaign to elect the ill-fated Whitlam government. So I became a 1968 radical, with a difference: thanks to having grown up in a household strongly under the influence of a father who drowned his sorrows in protest against the British Empire and a mother who encouraged me to learn the arts of moral reasoning in Dissenting Protestant chapels, I became suspicious of consensus, mistrustful of the powerful, and sympathetic to the recognition of differences - in Australia this is called giving someone a 'fair go'.

How did you end up as a political theorist working in a university?

After winning a doctoral fellowship to work with C. B. Macpherson in Toronto, my vocation as a political thinker was chosen. Not only was Macpherson a hotline to Harold Laski, G. D. H. Cole, and other English liberal socialists, but it was in Toronto - where I attended lectures by

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's student - that I became really interested in writing about the recovery by German thinkers - from Max Weber to Jürgen Habermas - of the ideal of the public sphere. That was the dissertation topic that Macpherson agreed to supervise, and thereafter - with his quiet support and my passion for the subject - I couldn't give up political theory. Of course, when looking back at this period, I can see that this vocation was possible because the expanding university system in Britain and elsewhere meant there were job vacancies for political theorists. Today, the situation is depressingly different. There are few jobs and I worry a great deal about the future of the bright, young PhD candidates with whom I have contact. Staff are demoralized, there are few jobs, the pay is lousy, money is tight, and teaching loads are heavy. It almost seems pointless to keep alive something that is - despite everything - intellectually indispensable.

Apart from the academic influences, and Vietnam, who or what else has influenced your thinking?

Haunting childhood memories of open-air atomic testing a few hundred kilometres from the farm where I grew up. The assassination of Jack Kennedy. Meeting Don Bradman, who was a family friend. Hearing 'Route 66', live. Spending a year

in America when I was sixteen. Feeling ashamed when confronted for the first time by militant aboriginals. The Prague Spring. Publishing my first student newspaper article, called (inauspiciously) 'Strawberries, Cream and Democracy'. Travelling to Jogjakarta to learn Indonesian. Admiring Germaine Greer. Winning a fellowship to go to Cambridge, a place which sometimes made me feel like a wild colonial boy. Arriving at PCL, to teach in the spirit of Quintin Hogg , with pleasure. Relearning to see the world through the eyes of children. . . I could go on.

So what is the point of political theory?

No single definition of political theory should prevail. For my taste, political theory should aim to nurture public discourse about concepts, themes, principles that are more or less controversial, and to do so by means of the book, the internet, radio, television, lectures, and public debates. Political theorists should be exemplary public intellectuals. Political theory, if it has a future, must wriggle out of its academic cocoon. It should face up to its public responsibilities, and to do so with probity.

It has to ask difficult questions to which there are few or no available answers. Political theory should also help us develop eyes in the backs of our heads - to cultivate memories that make us more sensitive to the present and the future. And it should cultivate humility - the elixir of democracy - by defending re-worked versions of the old ideals of freedom, equality, solidarity, and difference. I'm a defender of pluralism, and I mean this in its most radical sense, which includes overturning settled conventions and prejudices, large and small. I often get called a leftist for this conviction, but tough: a native dislike of ideology ought to be one of the central concerns of any political thinker.

Naturally, it would be arrogant to suppose that the qualities of nurturing controversy, developing future-oriented memories, cultivating humility, and calling for equality, freedom, solidarity, and difference are somehow the monopoly of political philosophers. They aren't. These same qualities are shared with other public actors, including journalists, novelists, and civic activists who rightly worry about

> '*Political theory, if it has a future, must wriggle out of its academic cocoon. It should face up to its public responsibilities, and to do so with probity.*'

such matters as biogenetics, violence, and masculine privilege. But, despite all that has happened, there are still facilities and resources within the university which make it a good place within which to keep alive and enrich traditions of political thinking. My visions for CSD match this view. We have a building, some free time, and a stated public commitment to educate, to enrich others intellectually. CSD is like an under-resourced leaky boat, but it hasn't yet sunk in the waters of market competition and government manipulation. It's not likely to, and so we should use it for the highest possible ends.

What impact do you think your own interventions in public debates have had? For example, your first two civil society books, *Democracy and Civil Society*, and *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*?

Others will decide that. For me, these books were foundational. They helped make sense of work I had done earlier, and, like signposts in unfamiliar territory, they set me on a definite trajectory. So those books contain themes that are now familiar to anyone who knows my work: the need to reduce violence in human affairs; the political benefits of smaller, networked associations; a cosmopolitan suspicion of territorial state power, especially in its barbaric and unaccountable forms; the desirability of civility in everyday life; and the fundamental importance of cultivating public spheres as democratic instruments of power-sharing and of keeping power humble. When writing these books I became convinced that the old eighteenth-century distinction between state and civil society deserved a comeback, that it was important as a way of making empirical and normative sense of contemporary politics in all four corners of the earth. My *Civil Society: Old Images, New Perspectives* repeats this point. It tries to spell out, for instance, how the globalization of investment, the state-enforced flexibilization of economies, and the ravages of market forces can and must be counterbalanced not only by new forms of publicly accountable government, but also by the cultivation of a rich plurality of densely networked civil associations.

Standing behind such arguments is a long-standing concern with the subject of

> *'Given the tendency in the world of politics towards hubris, how, if at all, can its disastrous effects be overcome?'*

power, power-grabbing and power-sharing. The concept of power is, of course, central in the study of politics and international relations, as I learned from my first-ever essay at university. I defended the old-fashioned principle of a power-monitoring second chamber, and was marked down for that by a tutor who was a card-carrying unicameralist supporter of the Labour Party. I didn't give up easily. Indeed, the books on civil society could be seen as an extended personal reply to that tutor. The books are foundational in another sense: they focused my thinking, my writing, and my politics on the ancient problem of hubris, the ambitious desire to have more than one's share of power, a desire that inevitably produces bad effects. As I see it, the global renaissance of interest in civil society has a lot to do with the problem of unaccountable, overextended power which - especially in the twentieth century - has committed unprecedented, terrible crimes. Those crimes should remind us of the lessons about hubris first formulated by classical Greek thinkers and historians like Herodotus and Thucydides. Here's their problem: given the tendency in the world of politics towards hubris, how, if at

all, can its disastrous effects be overcome? In other words, can human beings find ways of organizing power that would release us from the permanent dangers of corruption, bossing, and bullying? Or is there no cure for hubris? Is life, as Hobbes thought, nothing more than an endless struggle for power that comes to rest only at the point of death? Or perhaps, as Heidegger thought, only divine intervention can rescue us from our own hubris?

I'm not absolutely certain how to reply to such questions. The books we've mentioned provide one possible answer. They propose better institutions for publicly monitoring and apportioning power so that those who exercize power, whether on the battlefield or in the bedroom, learn - as Spinoza put it - that they cannot make a table eat grass.

**What response has this line of argument engendered?**

Bitter attacks are often the best indicators of a book's influence. I've certainly had my fair share. Since the publication of the first two civil society books I've been called everything under the sun. The Yugoslav League of Communists once accused me of being a bourgeois apologist. Old Labour supporters in Britain - in the Thatcher period - called me a left-wing Thatcherite. I've been described as a liberal

intellectual featherweight, a socialist, a Germanophile, a cosmopolitan, a fellow-travelling Islamist. And I've been accused of being an anarcho-Foucauldian, or simply an anarchist.

The name-calling is understandable since what I've tried to do in my various books is to contribute to the regridding of the left-right distinction. As I explained in an essay on Norberto Bobbio, the historic division between left and right, which sprang up in the period between the American and French revolutions, ran aground, for a variety of reasons, during the twentieth century. I still think that it's desirable to perceive the distinction, especially because, normatively speaking, every body politic needs to remind itself that it contains legitimate divisions. But, taking up clues left by Hannah Arendt and Simone Weil - among others - I have come to think that our map of political divisions needs radically to be altered. Certain dramatic events in twentieth-century Europe - total war, the Gulag archipelago, fascism - require it. So in the civil society books I tried to develop a basic political division, identifiable in any context on earth, between those - I call them the Right - who favour the concentration of various forms of power and resources, and those - the Left - who, instead, favour the pluralisation, the rendering publicly unaccountable, the deconcentration, and the public monitoring of power. I admit that this distinction is unorthodox. It is unusual to say that the Left is a synonym for the democratic fight for greater democracy. But I stick to it, which perhaps explains why when I'm in the company of those who think of themselves as right-wing I sometimes get called a left-winger; and why, conversely, when I'm with left-wingers I'm sometimes called a right-winger.

What first aroused your interest in Central-East European thinkers?

Three developments made me aware of life behind the 'Iron Curtain' and got me interested in its philosophical and political dynamics. One was the re-birth of the peace movement in Britain at the end of the 1970s. In the view of Edward Thompson, the movement's best public intellectual - whose work I followed closely - it was the largest social movement since Chartism. Its public criticism of the proposed deployment of cruise, Pershing, and SS-20 missiles, as Thompson spotted, had implications for the other half of Europe. It wasn't possible to stop the deployments unless the geopolitical division of Europe was questioned.

This argument, codified in the famous END Appeal of 1980, led me to become something of an anthropologist of life on the other side of the curtain. For the first time, I read systematically, in whatever languages I could, the works of Adam Michnik, György Konrád, Jan Patocka, Václav Havel, and others. I made many friends there and, naturally, I sympathized with initiatives such as Charter 77. My sympathy for socialism correspondingly waned.

The second development was the rise of Thatcherism, and its pro-market attacks on statism in its Western and Eastern forms. From the mid-1970s, I thought that this extraordinarily successful renewal of some old-fashioned ideas in the European tradition - the protest against statism, the belief in the individual and the culture of possessive individualism, the fetish of market forces - was of historic significance. It spelled doom for both the Brezhnevite, late-socialist regimes of the East and for the Keynesian welfare state in the West. Then, finally, there was my personal involvement in the parallel, or 'Flying', university in Czechoslovakia. This involved travelling to places like Brno and Prague, in cops 'n' robbers conditions, to give lectures and lead apartment seminars. It was a risky activity, and it changed my thinking considerably. There, somewhere in the triangle stretching from Warsaw to Ljubljana and then to decadent West Berlin - where I spent a happy semester in the early 1980s - I and many others learned to speak the language of civil society. Subsequently, it has become, against considerable odds, a global language that has as much purchase in Djakarta, Tehran and Taipei as it has among intellectuals, journalists, and governmental figures in Prague, Paris and Lisbon.

What were you hoping to achieve with the Havel book?

I set out to write a book that dealt with the subject of power in fresh ways, a book that might someday even be compared favourably with Machiavelli's _The Prince_ or Hobbes's _Leviathan_. _Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts_ won't be so compared, but I'd like others to think of it as a manual for democrats. It probes the absurdities of dictatorial and totalitarian power, and it ponders the difficulty of creating and consolidating a democratic alternative. The book expresses my philosophical conviction that the lust for power is perennial, that it is therefore always in need of public monitoring and control.

Like my earlier study of Thomas Paine, the Havel book experiments with the art of being a public intellectual by writing differently about politics. Of course, there are other legitimate ways of practising the art of political writing: for instance, book reviews and standard RAE-type academic

> _'Václav Havel_ probes the absurdities of dictatorial and totalitarian power, and it ponders the difficulty of creating and consolidating a democratic alternative.'

Hegemony and Culture

Allen Chun *looks at how Taiwan's 'traditional Chinese culture' has perpetuated the authority of the state*

Since the late 1980s, a *perestroika* has been underway in Taiwan: that is, a regime-led democratization of the political system. This democratization has been characterized by, among other things, free elections, the promotion of indigenous rights, and the dismantling of the monolithic state-party apparatus. This process is partly rooted in the cultural policies pursued by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime since the 1940s.

In Taiwan, national culture is not just a neutral presence which citizens must take for granted as a natural aspect of their personal identity. It is, instead, a hegemonic presence whose fate is linked inextricably to the mechanism of political domination that has served to perpetuate the authority of the state.

Ernest Gellner, in *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), and Benedict Anderson, in *Imagined Communities* (1983), have highlighted the importance of culture in the emergence of the modern nation-state. Gellner recognizes that national culture not only has to transcend what Clifford Geertz has called the 'primordial sentiments' associated with local ethnic traditions, but has also to provide(through mass dissemination) the basis of shared consciousness, without which the unity of the nation as a solidary community of autonomous, equal individuals would inevitably dissolve. Likewise, Anderson's focus on 'print capitalism' and the role of a common colloquial language in disseminating the allegorical imagery of the nation and its empty, homogeneous notions of community also underscores the primacy of social imagination as the basis upon which a nation defines its own existence. In the case of Nationalist Taiwan, the complex invention of 'traditional Chinese culture' has been such an attempt to legitimize the existence of a Republic of China as 'imagined community'.

The construction of 'traditional Chinese culture' in postwar Taiwan has, first, entailed the suppression of the local (Taiwanese) culture in order to subordinate it to an all-embracing vision of Chinese history and civilization. Secondly, it has invoked a sense of national identity that depends not only on the explicit promotion of patriotic sentiment in the form of mass demonstrations and public displays, but, more importantly, on the implicit cultivation of social values and shared beliefs through knowledge (such as Confucianism, a sense of continuous history, archaeological discovery, the preservation of language, and the proprietary control of the arts). Thirdly, the defense of traditional culture has often became the rallying point for national survival, just as Chinese culture's rootedness in history and civilization has been used to legitimize the utopianism of Nationalist political thought as well as the various instruments of state authority, most notably the Party, the military, and the government. 'Traditional Chinese culture' has been ultimately a 'political' culture, in the general sense of embracing the entire polity, and in the specific sense of representing the various institutions in power, i.e. the Nationalist government, Nationalist party ideology, and a Nationalist community bound together by a single language, history and civilization.

CULTURAL REUNIFICATION

Roughly speaking, there have been three different phases of cultural policy in Taiwan: these can be called the periods of cultural reunification, cultural renaissance, and cultural reconstruction. The first dates from 1945, when Japan returned Taiwan to China at the end of the Second WorldWar, to 1967, the height of the Cultural Revolution in mainland China. This period was marked by the need to reconsolidate Chinese culture by purging Japanese influences still present after fifty years of colonial rule, and by suppressing any movement toward local Taiwanese cultural expression. The main tool of cultural reunification was the forced imposition of standard Mandarin as the language of everyday communication and as the medium for disseminating social values. The ban on colloquial Taiwanese and Japanese in the government-controlled mass media - radio, film, television, and newspapers - along with a ban on all publications originating in Japan and mainland China remained in effect throughout the period of martial law (1945-88). The dictatorship of a unified language became in turn the precondition for the widespread inculcation of Chinese traditional history, thought and values.

CULTURAL RENAISSANCE

The second phase of cultural discourse ran from 1967 to1977. In 1966, partly to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen (founder and first president of the Republic) but mainly in reaction to the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, the KMT (the ruling Nationalist party) initiated a large-scale cultural renaissance movement (*wenhua fuxing yundong*). Cultural renaissance was a three-step process that involved public dissemination, moral education, and active demonstration. Courses on society and ethics, and citizenship and morality, were taught at elementary and middle school levels, respectively. In high schools, an introduction to Chinese culture, military education, and thought and personality became a staple part of the curriculum and supplemented courses in natural and social science. Outside the classroom, essay and oratory contests on topics pertaining to Chinese culture were regularly held as were peer-group study sessions to discuss current speeches and political writings. These were occasionally supplemented by traditional culture

activities in music, fine arts, calligraphy, and theatre.

The KMT's promotion of the cultural renaissance movement was a systematic effort to redefine the content of traditional culture and values, to cultivate a large-scale societal consciousness through existing institutional means, and to use social expression as the motor for national development in other domains, both economic and political. This cultivation of a cultural consciousness was also explicitly linked with other cultural policies: extending ties with overseas Chinese and foreign cultural agencies; financing grassroots cultural groups; developing the tourist industry; publishing the classics; preserving historical artifacts; promoting the sciences, ethics, social welfare and sports in schools and in communities; as well as, in the mass media, using culture to intensify anti-communist propaganda.

CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION

The cultural renaissance movement led eventually to the promotion of cultural reconstruction (*wenhua jianshe*), which began in 1977 and continues today. The call for cultural reconstruction was the last of twelve recommendations made by the then President Chiang Ching-kuo to the Legislative Yuan (the National Legislative Assembly) on 23 September, 1977 as part of his plan for national development. A Committee for Cultural Reconstruction (*wenhua jianshe weiyuanhui*) was created in November 1981 as the agency responsible for the management of cultural affairs; it operated directly under the aegis of the Executive Yuan (the executive branch) and emphasized 'fine arts' such as music, art, and theatre, and heritage conservation.

In the field of high culture, the Committee for Cultural Reconstruction has promoted the preservation of 'national treasures' and 'cultural education', and supported the production of knowledge pertaining to all aspects of the classical past. Cultural centres (*wenhua zhongxin*) have not only disseminated the larger view of Chinese tradition but have also promoted interest in and protect the survival of folk ethnic traditions. In line with its 'unpolitical' orientation, the Committee's sponsorship of culture and the arts is not limited to things Chinese: it regularly includes cultural exchanges of various kinds. The domestication of culture during this era of 'reconstruction' has coincided with the development of 'the

culture industry' in Taiwan, that is, tourism, mass media, film, and popular music.

In historical retrospect, cultural reunification provided the framework within which full-scale sinicization could take place. The forced imposition of Mandarin as the standard medium of everyday public communication was an important precondition for the eventual dissemination of Chinese culture, the promotion of traditional values, and the mandate of a continuous history, all of which had as their goal the subordination of local ethnic traditions to the political mainstream. At the height of the cultural renaissance movement, the promotion of culture became a large scale, state-sponsored programme that both used mass public events to orchestrate a sense of shared societal consciousness and inculcated this consciousness through the system of mass education and other avenues of socialization (for example, military training).

In the first two phases of cultural policy, culture was used for politically conservative ends. Culture was totalizing: it had to be embraced by all citizens. The regime took a proprietary attitude toward culture. The defence of culture involved not only the protection of artifacts but also the preservation of language and other traits of civilization against all forms of corruption (for example, Chinese character simplification and folk superstition). To say the least, this conservative attitude toward

> 'The complex invention of "traditional Chinese culture" has been an attempt to legitimize the existence of a Republic of China as "imagined community".'

culture reflected the hard line politics of the Cold War era. On the one hand, the KMT's control of Chinese culture was backed by martial law; on the other hand, the righteous causes invoked by culture appeared to legitimize the repressive technology that characterized the state's authoritarian regime.

Yet, despite the intensity of repression during the Cold War years, local ethnic traditions and the primordial sentiments attached to them were not fully eradicated. Ethnic tensions between indigenous Taiwanese (*benshengren*), who constituted the majority of the island's population,

and mainlanders (*waishengren*), who were still the mainstream voice in government circles, remained high. This 'ethnic dualism' was complicated, too, by a generation of youth who identified with Taiwan, regardless of ethnic origin.

TURNING POINT

The promotion of cultural reconstruction, however, marks a significant turning point in the politics of culture in Taiwan. Partly a reaction to Taiwan's increasing diplomatic isolation, it is a larger policy initiative designed to stimulate fullly-fledged economic progress in order to raise standards of living and to move away from the confrontational tactics of Cold War politics that viewed military security as a prime objective of national policy. Central government has loosened its control over the market and encouraged the development of an export-oriented economy. Commercialization of the economy has been allowed to filter into society as a whole. (And flourishing individual wealth has begun to corrupt the kind of traditional ethics that the government had tried to promote during the era of cultural renaissance.) Against the background of these developments, culture has become viewed as less of a 'political' entity and more as an object of consumption in a free-market economy. The scope of cultural reconstruction has not only been extended to cover the advancement of Western fine arts and other forms of high culture; it has also, and more importantly, transformed the idea of culture from something that consists of traits inseparable from national identity and national destiny to a consumer good inextricably linked to the needs of everyday life.

The apparent blooming of culture and the arts in the age of new-found prosperity might lead one to think that culture has been 'de-politicized'; on the contrary, however, the trend toward the secularization of culture has simply been an attempt both to sublimate the hegemonic character of cultural China and to transforms culture into and object of desire that could be manipulated by the culture industry. Cultural centres have become agents of the active promotion of cultural activities of all kinds as well as of research into folk custom and history; the fruits of such activity have been meant to magnify the greater tree of Chinese culture by showing how advances in   culture reflect social

progress. The renewed impetus to promote culture at the local level and to market culture generally as an object of desirable consumption is consistent with the KMT's parallel attempt to 'indigenize' Nationalist politics (that is, place it within a more pragmatic, Taiwan-centred, rather then Republic of China-centred, framework). President Chiang Ching-kuo (1977-89), unlike his father, Chiang Kai-shek, often emphasized that he was Taiwanese and sought repeatedly to defuse sharp ethnic dualism between mainlanders and Taiwanese, often in the process infuriating the KMT's old guard. His choice of Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, to succeed him underscored his objective of indigenizing the state apparatus while at the same time reaffirming the rootedness of local Taiwanese culture within the mainstream of traditional Chinese civilization. Without really abandoning the claims of past KMT regimes to 'recover the mainland', he chose instead to ground the conceptual ideals of traditional China to fit the territorial reality of Taiwan. By accommodating the potential reality of a Taiwanese (albeit scaled down Nationalist) state, the younger Chiang, in the view of the KMT Old Guard, weakened the very legitimacy of a 'Republic of China'. In compensation, however, he appeared to achieve an even greater cultural hegemony by attempting to absorb the indigenous Taiwanese population into the folds of a greater Nationalist society. Yet despite the appearance of reformism, there was little indication that the government had actually relinquished its authority over the practice of culture. The culture industry remained very much a state enterprise.

MIDDLE OF THE ROAD

Taiwan has embarked quietly on a middle-of-the-road course between the conservatism of the KMT old guard and the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This is a consequence of two developments: first, Chiang Ching-kuo's policy of directing political energy towards the full scale development of the economy - the aim has been to combat Taiwan's increasing political isolation stemming from its gradual rejection by the diplo-

matic family of nations; and, secondly, Chiang's general shift away from the confrontational tactics of the Cold War and toward the indigenization of Nationalist policy. As a result of the economic boom and of shifting social lifestyles, Chiang legalized the existence of opposition parties in 1986 as a prelude to free elections, then relaxed strict censorship over the press in 1987, and finally lifted martial law entirely in 1988.

Chiang's reformism was not precipitated by a humanistic urge to bring about democratic change for its own sake but rather by a pragmatic political view which sought to capture majority support for the KMT among the populace by deliberately avoiding the divisive politics that had characterized the authoritarian style of Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, he used the full power of central government to pursue a conciliatory agenda that aimed at least in theory to include in the polity all of Taiwan and its citizens.

The first free legislative elections of 1990 appeared to prove him right, with the KMT garnering 75 percent of the popular vote against the DPP's 25 percent. The DPP's defeat was even more crushing when one considers that the DPP's was advocating Taiwanese independence to a population that was 75 percent ethnic Taiwanese, and whose demonstrations in the past had been subject to brutal suppression. Clearly, this was not an ethnically dormant Yugoslavia or USSR. Cultural reconstruction, buttressed by a changing political economy that emerged with the development of a market economy, had achieved a hegemony which would have seemed unlikely few decades earlier.

Despite winning the people's mandate, Chiang Ching-kuo's reforms have not brought about liberal democracy. On the contrary, through his creation of a Nationalist Taiwan, Chiang constructed a

> ' Chiang Ching-kuo chose instead to ground the conceptual ideals of traditional China to fit the territorial reality of Taiwan.'

homogeneous nation-state in the classic sense, where cultural consciousness constitutes the basis for defining national identity. This homogeneity has been achieved by downplaying or transcending the 'primordial sentiments' that would have given rise to divisiveness (through ethnic affiliation or religion) and by opting to accent seemingly 'neutral' ideologies that capitalized on a shared sense of ethics, history, and civilization that could serve as the basis of an 'uncontested' national identity. National solidarity in this sense depends on homogeneity. It may recognize differences in fact but successfully subordinates them to a higher sense of commonality. This is not a consensus brought about by a plurality of voices, as in the case of a civil society.

In sum, the success of Taiwan's *perestroika* gamble may be attributed to what Jean Louis Margolin, echoing Pierre Mendes-France's dictum 'to govern is to anticipate', has called Chiang Ching-kuo's 'premonition'.

Allen Chun is a Senior Research Fellow at CSD. This is an edited version of a paper he gave to the CSD Research Seminar in October 1999.

Review

FEAR

Bernard Rorke

The Smell of Humans: A Memoir of the Holocaust in Hungary

Ernö Szép
Corvina Books/Central European
University Press, Budapest 1994.

A Wartime Memoir:
Hungary 1944-45

Alaine Polcz
Corvina Books Limited
Budapest 1998

Memoir of Hungary, 1944-1948

Sándor Márai
Corvina Books/Central European
University Press, Budapest 1996.

On 15 October 1944, as Russian troops neared Budapest, Governor Horthy, the Hungarian leader, declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities. The news prompted wild jubilation among Ernö Szép's friends and neighbours. The tenants in his building thronged the stairs and corridors and removed the yellow star from the front of their building: 'All of Israel was rejoicing.' But a putsch by the fascist Arrow Cross led by Ferenc Szalasi, backed by German troops, heralded the onset of the darkest days for the Jews of Budapest. The new terror regime declared a total curfew restricting Jews to their buildings and invalidating all letters of exemption and protective passes issued by the Governor or foreign states. Jews had to sew back on the yellow star. For five days Szép and his fellow residents remained locked in their apartment building. He

> 'A putsch by the fascist Arrow Cross led by Ferenc Szalasi, backed by German troops, heralded the onset of the darkest days for the Jews of Budapest.'

recalls: 'No one dared to smuggle food into our building during those five days. And then on the sixth day. . . .'

On the sixth day, some fifty of the elderly men in the apartment building were rounded up at gunpoint and taken away. The remainder of Szép's memoir recalls the ordeal of nineteen days in captivity. Szép expresses appalled stupefaction at the cruelties meted out by his captors. When one man who collapsed from exhaustion is shot in the head, and his body kicked into a ditch, Szép reflects that '(t)his was how a life was extinguished now: no announcement, no glass hearse with wreaths, no high-flown funeral orations, no family members in mourning, no old friends around to cast a lump of earth into your grave'.

With an eye for exact detail, an epigrammatic style and a melancholy humour that never succumbs to despair, Szep records the humiliations suffered by the captives, as well their own trivial bickering and petty rivalries, and bears witness to the dignity, courage, and resilience shown by these elderly men in the face of unrestrained cruelty. Szép and some others were suddenly released on 8 November: 'It was the ninth of November when we got home. I will not go on to narrate what happened starting on the tenth. What I feel is not to be described, not to be believed.' Szep survived the subsequent Arrow Cross campaign of terror against the Jewish population that lasted until the Russians took Budapest on 13 February 1945. His brothers Joszef and Marton and his sister Vilma were not so fortunate.

After 1947, *The Smell of Humans* was not reprinted under the communist regime, and was nearly forgotten. The post-war fiction of Soviet–Hungarian comradeship demanded much 'forgetting', and the distortions of official communist history meant that the atrocities committed against civilians by the advancing Russian army were excised from the historical record. Alaine Polcz's powerful *A Wartime Memoir* recounts her experiences as she, her husband and her mother-in-law found themselves caught up in the front line of fierce battles between Hungarian and German forces and the advancing Red Army. It did not occur to Polcz that the Russians might harm her.

She had seen the posters in Budapest showing a Soviet soldier ripping a crucifix from a woman's neck, she had read the leaflets reporting that they raped women and committed other horrors, and dismissed as German propaganda the claim that the Russians broke women's backs. Abducted by the Russians, she then learns how, 'very simply, unintentionally', they broke the backs of women - and explains in precise terms just how such injuries were inflicted. Polcz's account, in a sparse, unadorned prose, of her multiple and repeated rapes, whippings, and beatings at the hands of the Russians makes for harrowing reading; this is a vivid testament of 'a woman's life at the front: 'Hunger, lice, digging trenches, peeling potatoes, cold, filth. This life was not only mine. My husband's whitehaired mother was dragged away and raped as pubescent girls were. Russian soldiers attacked me, beat me, protected me, stepped on my hand with a boot, fed me.'

As in Szép's memoir the reader gets a sense of the fear which pervaded all social relations, the absolute vulnerability of the individual in the face of arbitrary and unpredictable terror. This sense of fear, all-consuming and ever-present, dominates the grim narrative. Among defenceless civilians, the village occupied one day by the Germans, the next by the Russians, Polcz was always more afraid of the Germans, 'for when they said there would be an execution, then you could be certain they would execute someone. But with the Russians, you could never know anything, never figure out anything'. Some days they fed and petted her, protected her, 'on another winter morning, however, they flogged me'. On another occasion, after being ordered to translate a German leaflet, she was taken away on suspicion of being a spy and hauled before a summary court. When she tried to explain to them that everyone in western civilization used Latin letters she was met with disbelief: they thought the whole world used the Cyrillic alphabet. When they found the village teacher he informed them that Latin letters actually exist. 'In a jiffy, without further ado, "You may go!", they

> **Erratum**
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> In the last issue of the *Bulletin* we forgot to provide the publication details of one book we reviewed. The book was Stuart Stein's *Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists*, and the missing details are: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999,

released me. This was the way they did it. Carrying out an execution was no special ceremony either.'

Then, one day in March 1945, without warning, the Russians evacuated the village and disappeared. As Polcz returned to the ruins of Budapest to find her mother and the rest of her family, she thought 'the war was over, that easier times lay ahead. I was mistaken'. Around the same time Sándor Márai and his wife, on hearing that the Germans had left, made their way back to the city, 'to find in some cellar (his) mother, brothers and sisters and friends, whatever was left of the old life'. They found only some firewalls of their home standing, and his top hat and a French porcelain candlestick on the top of the mushy pile of ruins. Márai's *Memoir of Hungary* provides a poignant, humorous and acerbic portrait of daily life in this grim phase of his country's history, 1945-47, the period between the German occupation and the Communist takeover. A prolific novelist and essayist, the dominant theme in his writings is the disintegration of the Hungarian middle class, which he castigates for failing to rise, between the two world wars, to the historic challenge of creating a democratic culture; for their crassness, greed and corruption; and for their right-wing political orientation - their adulation of the Germans, Marai maintains, seduced the class into becoming a tool of Nazism, thus 'smuggling the viciousness and perversity of that modern form of dictatorship into Eastern Europe'.

In this memoir Márai's target is communism and all those fellow-travellers he deemed to be collaborators with the Bolshevization of post-war Hungarian society. The 'librettists of official Communist propaganda', he writes, described the end of the Second World War as the 'Time of Liberation'. And indeed it was , not least for the surviving Jews of Budapest, for whom the arrival of the Red Army marked the cessation of the fiendish endeavour to annihilate them.

Márai describes the communists as working like the spider weaving its web, and the period 'after the siege' was a time when the spiders web seemed to cover everything and the web grew stickier and thicker every day. 'One couldn't always sense this directly and immediately, but the Spider emitted a thread every day - now the textbooks and schools, now a decree on public works. Then the house wardens, the control of private lives, the

workplace, the garbage disposer, family life. One day the Communists made a man disappear, the next an old, tested institution. Or an idea. Every time the 'web vibrated', the Spider and his little spiders glanced around to gauge the temperature of the opposition. When nothing happened they heaved a sigh of relief. The spider's web - invisibly but constantly spinning - thickened, emitting its smothering, all-enveloping threads.'

By early 1947, the illusion of a 'rose-coloured democracy' had been shattered. 'After two years of democratic scene-shift-

> 'The Communists were fully aware that the system, brought into existence through deceit and violence, could only be sustained by deceit and violence: "And for this there is never any other way, only the permanent threat of terror."'

ing, lying and exploratory perparation', the communists received orders from Moscow to complete the Bolshevization of Hungarian society. Márai maintains that the communists were fully aware that the system, brought into existence through deceit and violence, could only be sustained by deceit and violence: 'And for this there is never any other way, only the permanent threat of terror'. Márai likens the day-to-day machinations of the Terror to some horrible apparition in a nightmare, an unexpectedly fetid, life-threaten-

ing gas pervading the life and air of the city, as people began to disappear single-file into the system's dungeons. This was the fate of some of his early morning swimming companions at his local pool in Buda. At first he assumed the missing person had caught a cold - then the midday newspaper reported that the man had been arrested the night before as a 'conspirator'.

Márai realized he had to leave his country, not just because the Communists would not let him write freely, but because they would not let him be silent freely. He anticipated the moment when the mere fact of his presence within the system of terror would vindicate its violence. This, he realized, was the moment when it is not enough to be silent - 'the "no" must be declared with all its consequences . . . the moment when the contaminated area must be abandoned'.

Márai's memoir concludes with the moment of departure. 'As the train moved off 'in the star-studded night toward the world where no-one was waiting for us . . . in this moment - for the first time in my life - I really felt fear. I realized I was free. I began to feel fear'. He was never to return to Hungary and forbade the publication of his works until the occupying Soviet military forces had left the country, a multi-party system with the force of law had been introduced, and internationally supervised democratic elections held. He took his own life in 1989.

Bernard Rorke is a PhD candidate at CSD. He lives in Budapest, where he is Program Coordinator of the Open Society Institute's Roma Participation Program.

CSD TRUST FUND

In support of its long-term development plan plans, the Centre for the Study of Democracy has established an interest-earning known fund as the CSD Trust Fund.

The Fund aims, broadly, to supplement CSD's current revenue base (drawn from taught Masters' courses, research student fees, government research grants, and individual research contract sources) and so to provide for the things that we urgently want to do. CSD needs additional funds to encourage staff development and to support our publications, seminars, and conferences; and to enable us to appoint additional teaching, research, administrative and library staff. Support is also needed to create an enlarged community of resident scholars and postgraduate students; and to publicize better the work and good reputation of CSD on a European and global basis.

The establishment of the CSD Trust Fund, and the launching of an appeal to raise an endowment to support these various appointments and activities, was initially supported by a modest grant from the University. The CSD Trust Fund operates strictly under the auspices of the University of Westminster Prizes and Scholarships Fund, to whose Trustees it is directly accountable. Decisions about fund-raising and disbursements are initially formulated by a CSD Trust Fund Working Group, which includes several CSD staff, senior University representatives, well-placed patrons of the appeal, and a representative of the CSD Council of Advisers. In principle, the functions and activities of the CSD Trust Fund are kept quite separate from the governing institutions of the Centre, including its commitments to the wider University structures.

Requests for further details and offers of financial support should be directed to: Professor John Keane, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, United Kingdom.

books and journal articles; and preparing conference lectures. And I'm aware that biography is often criticized as a poor relation of history, literature, philosophy, and political science. I nevertheless chose the biography form for several reasons. Partly, it has the advantage of using the rivetting qualities of the individual who is under the microscope to 'hook' a readership outside the university. Individual lives are somehow more publicly attractive than talk of discourses, truth, classes, nations, legislatures, or globalization. Also, the form of biography is undergoing a rather interesting long-term transition. There is, of course, a standard form of biography, with which I don't feel comfortable. Narrating one damned fact after another, its so-called comprehensiveness is tedious - and philosophically blind to the way its plot structures colour the 'facts'. Standard biography tends to be conservative. It has comforting role for readers, who plough through someone's life from pedigree to grave.

I'm trying to redefine biography, which, despite all its weaknesses, has the advantage of protecting the dead, especially the losers, against the condescension of posterity. If democracy among the living requires democracy among the dead then one of the advantages of biography is that it helps to resurrect in words the life and times of individuals who are already dead, or soon will be, thereby granting them some measure of immortality.

Ever since Lytton Strachey's spirited attack on Victorian biography, biography has also become a medium for questioning the self-perception of famous individuals, and what others foolishly say about these individuals. At its best, biography is wonderfully iconoclastic. It can prick the backsides of the powerful. It can help overcome hubris by refusing nonsense, and by scaling down the pompous - by saying things that, in a small way, help to shake the world and stop it falling asleep.

John Keane is the Director of CSD. He was interviewed in December 1999. This is the first in an occasional series of interviews with well-known academics.

Montesquieu's Vision of Uncertainty and Modernity in Political Philosophy

Christopher Sparks

Edwin Mellen Press, 1999, £49.95.
ISBN: 0 7734 7976 7

'This text is both about Montesquieu and uses him to consider a range of broader issues: in particular questions of philosophical certainty and uncertainty and the relation of Montesquieu's work to historical, literary and social changes. Dr Sparks's approach provides a wide-ranging and multifaceted analysis of Montesquieu and gives his work a significant contemporary relevance . . . interesting and well-written.' – Gerald R. Taylor

CSD

THE WESTMINSTER SEMINARS
Democratic Reform in International Perspective

Although Britain is a long-established democracy, it is now undergoing major constitutional changes intended to make British government more 'democratic'. Debates among political theorists emphasize that this term does not have an agreed meaning, and there are potential conflicts and even contradictions between competing values. A look at other established democracies shows that the practice of democracy can take many forms, and often they are 'un-British', for example, the use of proportional representation. Concurrently, other democracies have often spoken admiringly of what is distinctively British in government.

A good way to understand the operation and consequences of 'un-British' institutions is to talk to people who are accustomed to using these institutions, in order to see what may be learned - positively or negatively - from what is happening in countries that are not governed by the Westminster model.

To open up the discussion of reform, the Westminster Seminars have been created to provide a forum bringing experts from abroad to discuss ideas and institutions relevant to the current British debate. In this way, people of diverse views can hear and question people with firsthand experience of different representative institutions.

The seminars are intended to inform discussion and not to promote a single point of view. There is an all-party advisory committee with David Butler, President of the Hansard Society, Lord Holme, Professor Lord Norton of Louth, Professor Lord Plant, and Professor John Keane, Centre for the Study of Democracy. Funding has come from the British Academy and from the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster.

The convenor is Professor Richard Rose.

Two dates have been fixed for early 2000:

Is There a Constitutional Path to Independence? Neil MacCormick, FBA, MEP, University of Edinburgh. 12.30pm, 7 February, Constitution Unit, University College London, 29/30 Tavistock Square, London WC1.

Electing a Mayor: The American Experience. Paul Peterson, Harvard University. 5.30pm, 28 March, British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1.

The Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is the postgraduate and post-doctoral research centre of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster. Well known for its inter-disciplinary work, CSD is led by a team of internationally recognized scholars whose teaching and research concentrate on the interplay of states, cultures and civil societies. CSD also supports research into all aspects of the past, present and future of democracy, in such diverse areas as political theory and philosophy, international relations and law, European Union social policy, gender and politics, mass media and communications, and the politics and culture of China, Europe, the United States, and Muslim societies. CSD is located in the School of Social and Behavioural Sciences (SBS) on the Regent Campus, and works alongside the influential Policy Studies Institute. It hosts seminars, public lectures and symposia in its efforts to foster greater awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of democracy in the public and private spheres at local, regional, national, and international levels. It offers a number of MAs on a one-year full-time, two-year part-time, basis (see back page for details). CSD's publications include a series of working papers entitled *CSD Perspectives* and this bulletin. *CSD Bulletin* aims to inform other university departments and public organizations, and our colleagues and undergraduates at the University of Westminster, of CSD's research activities. The *Bulletin* comprises reports of 'work in progress' of our research students and staff and contributions from visiting researchers and speakers. Comments on the content of this *Bulletin*, or requests to receive it, should be directed to The Editor, *CSD Bulletin*, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR. As with all CSD publications and events, the opinions expressed in these pages do not necessarily represent those held generally or officially in CSD or the University of Westminster.

CSD Programme

FEBRUARY 2000

7 Westminster Seminar
Neil MacCormick (University of Edinburgh)
'Is There a Constitutional Path to Independence?'

8 Albert Weale (University of Essex)
'A Sceptical Look at Deliberative Democracy'

15 John Keane (CSD)
'The Future of Democracy'

MARCH
7 Rainer Bauböck (University of Vienna)
'The Limits of Self-Determination'

14 Ali Tajvidi' (CSD)
'Superpower Impotence: US Policy Towards the Islamic Republic'

MARCH (cont.)
28 Westminster Seminar
Paul Peterson (Harvard University)
'Electing a Mayor: the American Experience'

APRIL
4 Byron Shafer (Nuffield College, Oxford)
and **Marc Stears (University of Bristol)** 'From Social Welfare to Cultural Values: The Puzzle of Post-war Change in Britain and the United States'

MAY
2 Milton Tosto (CSD) 'The Language, Meaning, and Intentions of Liberalism on Post-Authoritarian Brazil'

9 An Encounter with Quentin Skinner

JUNE
7 Beatrice Hauser (King's College, London)
'A War to Go with a Birthday: Kosovo and Nato'

CSD PERSPECTIVES

A series of monographs published by the University of Westminster

The Betrayal of Bosnia, Lee Bryant (1993). ISBN : 1 85919 035 9.

Nations, Nationalism, and the European Citizen, John Keane (1993). ISBN : 1 85919 040 5.

Universal Human Rights? The Rhetoric of International Law, Jeremy Colwill (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 040 5.

Islam and the Creation of European Identity Tomaz Mastnak (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 026 X.

Uncertainty and Identity: the Enlightenment and its Shadows, Chris Sparks. (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 031 6.

The Making of a Weak State: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906, Mehdi Moslem (1995). ISBN: 1 85919 071 5.

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Perspectives on European Integration Richard Whitman (1995). ISBN: 1 85919 002 2.

Renewing Local Representative Democracy: Councillors, Communities, Communication Keith Taylor (1996). ISBN: 1 85919 082 0.

European Democracy at the Russian Crossroads, Irene Brennan (1996). ISBN: 1 85919 077 4.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Obstacles and Prospects Richard Whitman (1996). ISBN: 1859190480.

Managing Variety: Issues in the Integration and Disintegration of States Margaret Blunden (1997). ISBN: 1859190685.

Beyond Revisionism: the Politics of Irish Nationalism Bernard Rorke (1999) ISBN: 0 859 19 079 0

Refugees and Violence Pierre Hassner and Bridget Cotter (1999). ISBN: 085919 084 7

On Communicative Abundance John Keane (1999). ISBN: 0 859 19 089 8

The monographs, priced at £7.50 each, are available from CSD, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR. Make cheques payable to 'University of Westsminster'.

MASTERS DEGREES AT CSD

MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY

This taught MA (one year full-time, two years part-time), which aims to dissolve a number of conventional sub-disciplinary boundaries, provides a framework for integrated study that embraces Politics, Political Theory, International Relations, and cognate disciplines such as communications in an innovative and intellectually challenging way.

Modules: International Relations Theory; The State, Politics and Violence; The Human Sciences – Perspectives and Methods; European Integration and the Development of International Society; Option Module; Dissertation/ Thesis.

Students may begin the course in September or February.

For specific enquiries contact Dr Richard Whitman, CSD,University of Westminster, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, UK. Tel: +44 020 7468 2257; fax: + 44 020 7911 5164; email: whitmar@westminster.ac.uk

MA IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL CHINESE STUDIES

This unique, new programme (one year full-time, two years part-time) uses an interdisciplinary cultural studies approach to develop new avenues of learning and research in the field of contemporary Chinese socities: the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Chinese diaspora.

MA modules include: Problems and Perspectives in Cultural Studies; Chinese 'Nation-States' in Cross-Cultural Perspective; The Politics of Contemporary Chinese Art; Gender and Sexuality in Contemporary Chinese Culture; Contemporary Chinese Writing; Dress and Cultural 'Identities' in Chinese Societies; the Internet as a Research Resource for Contemporary Chinese Societies.

For specific enquiries contact Dr Harriet Evans, CSD, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, UK. Tel: +44 020 7468 2254/7911 5138; fax: 7911 5164;email: evansh@westminster.ac.uk

NEW MAs

Beginning in October 2000 (subject to validation), CSD will be offering the following MAs (one year full-time, two years part-time):

MA International Relations
MA Contemporary Political Theory
MA Political Theory and European Studies
MA European Studies and International Relations.

Contact Dr Richard Whitman (see box on left) for details.

FURTHER INFORMATION AND APPLICATION FORMS

For MA International Relations and Political Theory and for MA in Contemporary Chinese Cultural Studies: Admissions and Marketing Office, University of Westminster, 16 Riding House Street, London W1P 7PB. Tel: +44 020 7911 5088; fax: +44 020 7911 5175; email: regent@westminster.ac.uk.

Further details on the Internet: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/csd.