and the comments on Ringer by Jürgen Habermas in “The Intellectual and Social Background of the German University Crisis,” Minerva, vol. 9, no. 3 (1971), pp. 422–8.
98 MSS, pp. 176 and 55: “Even the knowledge of the most certain proposition of our theoretical sciences — e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture.” Weber is not always consistent on this point. See, for example, MSS, p. 180, where it is denied that those natural sciences which take mechanics as their model are conditioned by subjective values.
99 Ibid., pp. 76, 77, 80, 85–6.
100 Ibid., pp. 74, 78–80, 159, 173, and 78: “We seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant in its individuality (Eigenart).” Particularly in his later writings, Weber modified this singularity postulate. While the ideal-typical quality of all cultural-scientific categories is still insisted upon, cultural-scientific analysis is seen to be concerned with concepts, analogies, and rules of cultural development that are general by virtue of their applicability to the history of not only our own but all civilizations (cf. GAW, p. 265; ES, pp. 19–22; and PE, p. 13).
101 MSS, pp. 74, 81, 125, 175; cf. RK, pp. 154, 157–8, 185–6, 217–18; GAW, p. 332; Stenmler, pp. 74–5, 96, 110–11, 139, 148; and ES, pp. 3ff.
102 FMW, p. 143; cf. FMW, pp. 144, 147.
103 MSS, p. 173; cf. MSS, p. 150; Stenmler, pp. 88–9, 112–15; “Freiburg,” p. 440; and FMW, p. 132.
104 This special concept of objectivity is frequently misunderstood, usually from a positivistic standpoint, the classic example of which is Theodore Abel, “The Operation Called Verstehen,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 54 (1948), pp. 211–18.
105 MSS, pp. 110, 130; “Freiburg,” p. 440; FMW, p. 132.
106 MSS, pp. 55, 61, 84, 110–11; cf. FMW, pp. 112 and 123: “No science is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the person who rejects these presuppositions.”
108 FMW, p. 147.
109 MSS, p. 92.
110 Ibid., pp. 53, 54; FMW, p. 152.
111 MSS, pp. 32ff.; FMW, pp. 151–2; “Freiburg,” p. 440.
112 FMW, p. 228.
114 FMW, p. 85.
116 GAW, pp. 416; GPS, pp. 169–70 and 152: “I have always viewed not only foreign affairs but all politics solely from a national point of view.” So many interpreters of Weber’s project have missed the significance of this conviction, which owed much to Ranke’s theory of history as a struggle between great powers. This omission is evident in Benjamin Nelson’s account of Weber’s introduction to this Gesamtmete Aufsätze zur Religionssozologie (FE, pp. 13–31) as a “master clue” to his larger intentions. Weber is interpreted as a “pioneer in the comparative historical differential sociological process and civilizational complexes” (Max Weber’s ‘Author’s Introduction’ [1920]: A Master Clue to His Main Aims,” Sociological Inquiry, vol. 44, no. 4 [1974], pp. 269–78). The affinity between this interpretation and Parson’s later works is here clear. See, for example, Parson’s “Comparative Studies and Evolutionary Change,” in I. Vallee (ed.), Comparative Methods in Sociology (Berkeley, Calif., 1971), pp. 97–130. Such interpretations seriously ignore the political context to which Weber addressed his scholarly and political texts — a context in which, among the German middle classes, a militant nationalism informed by Social Darwinist and racist assumptions became increasingly influential (cf. Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair [New York, 1961]). These interpretations also ignore and therefore depoliticize Weber’s explicit concern with the need to intervene politically against the threats posed by the general advance of bureaucracy under contemporary conditions. On his defense of the primacy of the principle of the nation-state, his “passionate championship of a German national imperialism,” see Mommsen, Max Weber und die Deutsche Politik, pp. 26–30; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy (Oxford, 1972), ch. 2: Anthony Giddens, Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber (London, 1972); and ibid., The Political Thought of Max Weber (New York, 1971), pp. 116ff.
117 Cf. ES, p. 926: “Every successful imperialist policy of coercing the outside normally — or at least at first — also strengthens the domestic prestige and therewith the power and influence of those classes, status groups, and parties, under whose leadership the success has been attained.”
118 Weber’s defense of the leadership principle is strongly evident in his later writings, particularly those concerning his campaign for a presidential system of government during and after the German winter elections of 1918–19. See, for example, GPS, pp. 472–5, 486–9. His concern with developing a theory of charismatic authority is also expressive of this defense of strong-willed, passionate leadership; see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Zum Begriff der ‚plebsstätraren Führerdemokratie‘ bei Max Weber,” Kölner Zeitschrif für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 395–409.
119 FMW, p. 95. This recommendation continuously informs Weber’s critique of the conduct of German domestic and foreign policy prior to and during World War I. This is summarized in GPS, p. 198: “Germany has given the best and most honest officialism in the world. The German performance in this war has shown what military discipline and bureaucratic efficiency is capable of. But the frightful failures of German policy have also demonstrated what cannot be achieved through this means.” See also his comparison of the British and German states’ treatment of striking workers under conditions of war in ibid., p. 286.
120 In his earliest writings on the 1905 Russian Revolution (GPS, pp. 76–8), Weber therefore criticized monarchical regimes for their incapacity to generate consistent and genuine leadership in the face of creeping bureaucratization.
121 FMW, pp. 115ff; see also the discussion of the theory of Führerdemokratie in Mommsen, “Zum Begriff der ‚plebsstätraren Führerdemokratie‘.”
122 FMW, p. 117.
124 FMW, p. 127.
125 Ibid., p. 120.
126 Ibid., p. 123.
128 FMW, p. 106.
129 Ibid., p. 103; see also ibid., pp. 104–6, where Weber argues this thesis with respect to the democratization of the franchise in England (and the ensuing bureaucratization...
of party politics, which culminated in Gladstone's ascent to office). Here Weber followed Ostrogorski's description in *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* of the growth of the plebiscitarian form in Britain and the United States. It should be noted that on other occasions (e.g., *GPS*, p. 214; *ES*, pp. 1419-20), and especially prior to the revolutionary disturbances of 1918-19, Weber criticized "token parliamentarism" and proposed (with the British parliamentary model in mind) the strengthening of legislative institutions, in order that they might function as a site of "positive politics," as a forum for the protection of civil rights and, above all, for the recruitment and training of genuine leaders.


131 FMW, p. 107.

132 FMW, p. 27.

133 FMW, p. 116.


136 FMW, pp. 84, 130, 169-70.


138 GAW, p. 265; cf. the misleading thesis of Niklas Luhmann (*The Differentiation of Society*, p. 23) that Weber's theory "with its impressive compactness, cannot be controverted within its own premises."


140 FMW, p. 90; cf. GAW, p. 184: "The conceptual boundaries within which the social world can become an object of observation and scientific explanation are impermanent. The presuppositions of the sociocultural sciences remain variable into the indefinite future, at least as long as an Oriental petricization of thinking does not smother the capacity to raise novel questions about the inexhaustible nature of social life." In respect of their admitted contingency, Weber's ideal-typical analyses are, strictly speaking, not outside "historical time," as has been claimed by Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy*, pp. 15, 74, and by J. G. March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958), p. 36.

141 FMW, p. 78; cf. *FMW*, pp. 82, 157, 159.

142 This point is correctly emphasized by Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (London, 1970), pp. 51, 51.

143 Consider the following statement (GAW, p. 277): "According to all available knowledge, the bureaucratization of society will at some point triumph over capitalism, in our civilization just as in ancient civilizations. In our civilization, the 'anarchy of production' will eventually also be replaced by an economic and social system analogous to that typical of the late Roman Empire, and especially of the 'New Kingdom' in Egypt or of the rule of the Parthians." For a somewhat different view of Weber's assumptions about historical processes, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Universalgeschichtliches und politisches Denken bei Max Weber," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 201 (1965), pp. 557ff.; and (from the perspective of developmental history) Wolfgang Schlucht, *The Rise of Western Rationalism* (Berkeley, 1981).

144 FMW, p. 82; *ES*, p. 194ff.

145 Cf. *PE*, pp. 77-78, where Weber notes (1) that eighteenth-century philosophical rationalism was most highly developed in geographic regions (e.g., France) where capitalist accumulation processes were considerably retarded, and (2) that the greatest degree of economic rationalization in England took place under conditions in which the great legal corporations retarded the retrieval and deployment of the rationalized Roman law of late antiquity.


147 This claim was often made during the nineteenth century (for example, by J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* [London, 1912], ch. 6), and was subsequently repeated by Harold J. Laski, "Bureaucracy," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1930), p. 71, and Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 180ff.

148 ES, pp. 140-1, 201. The restricted development of market capitalism because of the turning of public contributions into privately held benefits or lieux (as in China and the Near East after the time of the caliphs) and the monopolistic diversion of rational capital (as in the royal monopolies and monopolistic concessions of early modern times and the more recent corporate pursuit of short-run, speculative profit) are two cases in point.

149 *GPS*, pp. 32-3, 82-3, 140-1, 276; *FMW*, pp. 292-5; *GASW*, p. 475.


152 ES, p. 1418: "Bureaucracy's supreme power instrument is the transformation of official information into classified material by means of the notorious concept of the 'service secret.' In the last analysis, this is merely a means of protecting the administration against supervision."

153 FMW, pp. 224, 226; *GPS*, pp. 497, 547, 277, 466.

154 ES, pp. 983-7; *GPS*, pp. 255, 279.

155 ES, p. 138; see also FMW, pp. 201, 217, 226, 231; and "Socialism," p. 194.


158 FMW, p. 27: "Peace is nothing more than a change in the form of conflict or in the antagonists or in the objects of conflict, or finally in the chances of selection."


160 ES, pp. 202-03.

161 *GPS*, p. 61; *FMW*, p. 370.

162 FMW, p. 99; cf. ES, p. 952; and *GPS*, pp. 197, 227, and (on Bolshevism) 440.

163 FMW, p. 104; cf. *FMW*, p. 79. Conversely, Weber argued that the masses' proclivity
to irrational identification with leaders should be harnessed and ordered — through, for example, forms of "orderly democracy" (ES, p. 1451) or the discipline provided by trade unions (GWS, p. 295). On the charismatic prophets' harnessing of the devotion of their followers, see Weber's "Ancient Judaism" (New York, 1967).

164 "Socialism," p. 194; GWS, pp. 260 and 263: "Political character is cheaper and more acceptable for the wealthy man; no moralizing can change that."

165 FMW, p. 99.

166 Cf. ibid., pp. 113, 125, and ES, p. 1428. It does not follow from this suggestion, of course, that, as in the case of many other freedom-seeking impulses, a process of mechanism, a "brotherhood ethics" are or ought to be identical with socialist public life.

167 This point is suppressed in Hannah Arendt's one-sided and pessimistic conclusion that bureaucracy "is a form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act" (On Violence [New York, 1970], p. 81). Concerning the propensities of bureaucratic organizations to strive continually to incorporate and instrumentalize the opposition that it generates, see A. Gehlen, Überkritikierung, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie, vol. 3 (1950), pp. 195-208; Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), p. 58; Robert Michels, Political Parties (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 185-9; and Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, pp. 303-5.


169 MSS, p. 60 (original emphasis); cf. MSS, p. 57.

170 GASS, p. 412.

3. A totally administered society?


3 Theodor W. Adorno, "Relexionen zur Klasseentheorie" (1942), in Gesammlte Schriften, vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), p. 376.


5 Adorno insisted (Negative Dialectics [New York, 1973], p. 11) that "no philosophy, not even extreme empiricism, can drag in the facta bruta and present them like cases in anatomy or experiments in physics; no philosophy can paste the particulars into the text as seductive paintings would hoodwink it into believing."

6 Ibid., p. 5.

7 Minima Moralia, p. 87; in "Der Essay als Form" (pp. 27, 30) Adorno contends that the mode of argumentation of the essay form is critical theory per excellence, a form

of presentation that enhances the "joy of freedom with regard to an issue, a freedom which yields more from that issue than would result if it were coldly compelled into a system of ideas."


9 Foreshadowed by such writings as Georg Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig, 1909), the particularly seminal work in this post-Weberian project is undoubtedly Georg Lukács's "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," in Lukács's History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 83-122. In search of a solution to the "riddle of the commodity structure," Lukács attempted to reformulate the Marxist critique of the capitalist mode of production in light of the Weberian thesis on the rationalization of the modern world. Lukács accordingly posited the dominance of the reified commodity form as the key structural problem of capitalist society in both its objective and its subjective aspects. Within this framework of interpretation, the classical antinomies of bourgeois philosophy, such as idealism's dualistic separation of the object and the subject, were seen to be expressive of the inner logic of the commodification process, through which products assumed the appearance of separate objects apparently divorced from their equally reified producers. Expressive of this fetishism of commodities, bourgeois philosophy reifies its object as a fixed and immutable given. This philosophy thereby obfuscates the historical processes through which both production and consciousness come into being. Adorno acknowledges the crucial importance of the theory of reification in "Empresse Versöhnung," in Noten zur Literatur, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1961), p. 152.

10 This is apparent from the time of his critical analysis of Kierkegaard, first published as Kierkegall: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen (Tübingen, 1933), Back-Morris's The Origin of Negative Dialectics and David Held's Introduction to Critical Theory (London, 1960), ch. 7, incisively show that the conventional observation that the post-1938 work of the Frankfurt Institute broke decisively with the Marxist tradition ignores Adorno's continuing adherence to certain key Marxist themes, an adherence mediated by the problems raised by Walter Benjamin.


12 According to Marx, only the actual qualities of things have use value (Theories of Surplus Value, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1971), p. 129). These properties or qualities in no way contribute to the phantasmatic character of commodities: "The mystical character of commodities does not originate, ... in their use-value, ... the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom" (Capital, vol. 1, pp. 76-7). This formulation therefore considers these intersubjective, symbolically mediated processes through which objects (and, indeed, human labor power itself) come to be represented as useful in the first place; see Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, 1976), esp. ch. 3.

13 Negative Dialectics, p. 154.


16 Adorno, "Is Marx Obsolete?" p. 5; cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "Anmerkungen zum sozialen Konflikt heute" (1968), in Gesammlte Schriften, vol. 8, p. 188.

17 Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 134-7; cf. Adorno, "Reflexionen zur Klasseentheorie," p. 575: "In the market economy the untruth of the class concept remained latent; under monopoly conditions, it has become as transparent as its truth — the survival