Chapter 5
Stretching the Limits of the Democratic Imagination

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MAXIMIZING DEMOCRACY

During the past three decades, the work of C. B. Macpherson has been blown about by almost every wind of criticism. It has been dismissed as old-fashioned, as neglectful of the “perennial problems” of political philosophy, as an “unhistorical” distortion of past realities or, simply, as trapped on the wrong (or losing) side of the class struggle. These criticisms are unconvincing. They should be doubted, for they miss the fundamental and lasting importance of C. B. Macpherson’s project—his bold, lifelong attempt to revive the postwar democratic imagination.

For the good part of Macpherson’s distinguished career, the subject of democracy excited little passion among political philosophers. It was widely assumed that the theoretical foundations of contemporary Western democracies were self-evident and therefore uncontentious, and that the study of democracy was largely an empirical enterprise. Macpherson refused to accept this settled assumption. He supposed, correctly, that the meaning of democracy is not timeless, and that the
principles of democracy have been interpreted in diverse ways as their custodianship has changed hands. Guided by this insight that the struggle to control the definition or meaning of democracy is an intrinsic feature of modern societies, Macpherson challenged the belief that democracy is simply a method of choosing and authorizing governments, whose leaders are meritorious and whose citizens are passive and self-restrained subjects. He battled against the view that citizens in liberal democracies should “neither raise nor decide issues . . . the issues that shape their fate are normally raised and decided for them” (Schumpeter). He denied that democracy is a market-like process in which the leaders of political parties act as entrepreneurs, offering competing parcels of political goods to voters, who as consumers choose which party’s promised parcels they will buy at election time.

From the time of his essays of the early 1940s, Macpherson proposed a radical alternative to this vertical conception of democracy. He envisaged a postliberal and participatory democracy, by which he meant a social order which guarantees that all its members are equally free to actualize their human capacities. To defend a more participatory democracy in this sense is to work for the principle of the equal self-expression of individuals. It is to anticipate their emancipation from the outdated and contingent rules and regulations of long-established institutions. Democracy is an equitable and humane society which facilitates all individuals’ maximum self-development. In a fully democratic society, to use words Macpherson loved, “individuals would understand themselves as exereters and enjoyers of their own uniquely human capacities.”

THE METHODS OF DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL

There is a striking hiatus between this vision of democracy and the forms of “vertical” democracy celebrated by most democratic theorists during the period of the postwar settlement. This hiatus was reinforced by several methodological premises within Macpherson’s writings. Among the most important were his attempt to inject utopian themes into the discourse about democracy; his efforts to retrieve, question, and to develop liberal and democratic traditions of the early modern period; and his generous use of conceptual models, which aim to clarify and to highlight the most important elements of the complex reality addressed by his theory. These methodological premises require further examination, since they help to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of Macpherson’s project of maximizing democracy.

To begin with, Macpherson is best understood as a utopian in the philosophical sense. His call for participatory democracy was always intoxicated with the standard utopian technique of presenting exaggerated arguments which serve as positive standards against which the existing world and its justifications can be measured and judged as inadequate. Macpherson sensed, correctly, that today’s reality is often yesterday’s utopia and that tomorrow’s reality is often today’s utopia. In this respect, his utopia was a deliberate provocation of the status quo. Democracy was, for him, not a system of power to be preserved, but a condition to be sought after. Under less than favorable conditions, his theory asked for more democracy—for a “revolution in democratic consciousness.” Consonant with this utopian mode of thinking, Macpherson never provided a detailed picture of how to move from the present into the future. To criticize Macpherson, say, for disregarding the empirical subjects who would be capable of instituting a more democratic society is therefore beside the point, for this is only to describe his mode of thinking. Macpherson’s approach is better judged by its productivity—that is, by its capacity, first, to question the apparently natural and fixed boundaries of the present by drawing our attention to neglected problems; and second, by its ability to anticipate or open the way for democratic developments which cannot yet be institutionalized. In short, the success of Macpherson’s defense of democracy must be judged by the extent to which it functioned as a “fertile utopia” (Ernst Bloch).

A second methodological premise of Macpherson’s theory of democracy is its turn toward the Anglo-American liberal/democratic traditions of the past. Macpherson’s quiet conviction that this past speaks to us with a directness that wipes out the centuries impressed everyone who knew him. That is not to say that he was an archivist of old political ideas, or that he thought that we should live as though we were dead. Macpherson rather supposed that democratic traditions are as easy to lose as they are difficult to regain, and he therefore rebuked his contemporaries for their theoretical amnesia, for their embrace of a model of democracy founded on a condescending attitude toward the past. He perceived, correctly, that the past cannot be left to conservatives, and that contemporary democratic theory must develop eyes in the back of its head. It must nourish itself upon attempts to “rescue” the past by demonstrating its positive or negative meanings for those living in the present. According to Macpherson, the task of enquiring after what we
have become, or what we may become, obliges us to enquire after what we once conceived ourselves to be.

Those who wish for the maximization of democracy must zealously prevent things of great importance to democracy from passing into oblivion. The viability of democratic theory must therefore be judged, not by its forgetfulness of the past and embrace of "the new," but at least in part by its capacity to retrieve, extend, and to imaginatively transform the subversive themes of old bodies of political thinking. Democrats need to cultivate a remembrance of things past, for under contemporary conditions memory is a subversive weapon. The present survival and future growth of democracy require the extension of the vote to the most disenfranchised of all constituencies—our silenced ancestors. Democracy among the living requires democracy among the dead.

While Macpherson never assumed that the political principles of the past are sufficient for a changed and more complex late twentieth-century world, he did insist—to borrow an opening metaphor of The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism—that these founding principles can be built upon. The foundations of democracy may have cracked and tilted, but they can—if they are not to be demolished entirely—be repaired, preserved, and renewed. No doubt, Macpherson's retrieval of the liberal and democratic past was highly selective. This was quite in accordance with the deliberately excessive or utopian character of his concern to maximize democracy. Criticisms of the "unhistorical" character of Macpherson's interpretations of the history of modern political thought are therefore mistaken. The alleged weakness of Macpherson—this misrecognition of an actual historical past—was in fact one of his key strengths. He never attempted to faithfully "record" the past (as spectator theories of historical interpretation wrongly assume to be possible). His account of the past was deliberately selective. It was framed by analytic models (of different forms of society, or of different historical phases of the development of liberal/democratic theory) which served to isolate and emphasize certain (but not other) aspects of a past which, from Macpherson's point of view, are of great relevance to the task of democratizing the present.

It is true that he was sometimes tempted to say that these models reflect an underlying reality, and that they therefore correspond to actual thinkers and their actual contexts. Despite these occasional claims to having "clearly identified" the deeper objective significance of thinkers and societies of the past—claims which are refuted by recent developments in the theory of textual interpretation—Macpherson's defense of democracy always relied upon models which highlighted the important point that the definition of the past cannot ultimately be separated from the evaluation of its normative significance. These models addressed certain questions to their objects of analysis, setting them apart and treating them as worthy of recognition and analysis. Such questions served as something like one-sided vantage points from which the past could be classified, analyzed, understood, explained, and evaluated. In this precise sense, Macpherson's interpretation of the liberal/democratic tradition was consistently subjective. It was a species of ideal-typical analysis (in Max Weber's sense) that emphasized that certain aspects of modern reality are of crucial significance for the future of those who are living within the present.

**THE PROPERTY QUESTION**

Relying upon these three methodological premises, Macpherson explored the contemporary significance of the modern liberal/democratic tradition originating with Hobbes. His interpretation of this tradition both praised its central achievement—its positing of the free rational individual as the criterion of the good society—and criticized its basic assumptions as self-contradictory and, therefore, as practically unrealizable as such. Macpherson's affirmative criticism of the liberal/democratic tradition most often took the form of exposing strict inconsistencies within its theoretical structures. He worked within the terms of this tradition in order to transgress them. In other words, he demonstrated that certain crucial elements of the liberal tradition cannot be reconciled with democracy, and that, therefore, the vision of a liberal democratic society is self-paralyzing and impossible in practice.

Of fundamental importance to Macpherson's affirmative critique of liberalism was the question of property. In his view, nothing has given liberal/democratic theory more trouble than its conception of property rights. The argument, in brief, is that the fundamental problem of liberal/democratic theory consists in its difficulty of reconciling the liberal property right—the right of capitalist acts among consenting adults—with another right which is the grounding ethical principle of both liberal humanism and democracy: the equal effective right of all individuals to use and to develop their capacities. The self-paralysis of liberal/democratic theory is traced to its various attempts to shelter these two contradictory sets of rights. For when the de facto liberal property
powers are written into law and protected by the state as a natural individual right to the exclusive use and disposal of the resources provided by nature and of portions of the capital created by past labor on this nature; and when this political and legal guarantee of property rights is combined with liberal assumptions about infinite desire and a corresponding system of market incentives and rights of free contract, then liberal doctrine necessarily justifies a concentration of ownership of property and, hence, a system of power relations among individuals and classes which negates the ethical goal of autonomous individual development.

Macpherson’s critique of liberalism echoed the words of Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, which Marx himself quoted in Das Kapital: “You take my life / when you do the means whereby I live.” Within a possessive market society, in which there is a market in labor as well as in products, the liberal belief that unlimited desire is natural or rational encourages the establishment of the right of unlimited appropriation, which in turn leads to the concentration of ownership of the material means of labor. This concentration of property disadvantages the propertyless, who lose free access to the means of turning their capacity to labor into productive labor. Because they rarely have access to the means of independent production, and because they cannot demand in wages an amount equal to what would be the product of their labor on property of their own, the propertyless are disempowered. By employing the labor of others, those who monopolize property can effect a continual net transfer of powers (or some of the product of those powers) of the propertyless. According to Macpherson, an insoluble contradiction therefore lies at the heart of liberal/democratic theory. If, as this theory insists, an individual right to saleable property can effect a continual net transfer of powers (or some of the product of those powers) of the propertyless, then liberal doctrine is compatible with the activity of seventeenth-century liberalism: its insistence that what makes an individual human is freedom from dependence upon the will of others. The individuality defended by seventeenth-century liberalism was, at the same time, a fundamental denial of individuality. The freedom of individuals to enter voluntarily, if self-interestedly, into relations with other individuals was premised on their exercise of exclusive control over their bodies, capacities, and properties. In Macpherson’s view, it is precisely this exclusive control by some individuals that denies other individuals access to property and power, forcing them to alienate their capacity to labor and, with that, to relinquish their full powers of individual autonomy. The individuality of some—property owners—is therefore possible only insofar as they consume the individuality of others—laborers—within the institutional framework of a possessive market society. In sum, the market capitalism justified by seventeenth-century liberalism generated class differences in the effective rights and powers of individuals, yet required for its justification assumptions about equal natural rights and powers.

Elsewhere, the undemocratic implications of this contradiction are spelled out by analyzing the incompatibility between two concepts of the human essence. According to Macpherson, these two concepts of human nature—humanity as infinitely desirous consumers of utilities, and humanity as active developers of their unique potential—have coexisted less than peacefully for more than a century within the liberal/democratic tradition. They emerged at different historical moments, and in response to changes in the constellation of power in modern societies.

The first postulate—individuals as insatiable consumers and appropriators, as infinite antagonists of scarcity—was an invention of the emerging capitalist market society of seventeenth-century England. It was expressed most forcefully in the utilitarianism of Bentham and James Mill. This postulate was not only compatible with the activity required of individuals under capitalist conditions. It also functioned to justify the right of unrestricted individual appropriation, which was so necessary as an incentive to continuous effort in this new type of society. But from the time of the nineteenth century, Macpherson...
claimed, this liberal postulate was challenged increasingly by the democratic thesis that individuals are capable of freely exerting their manifold capacities. J. S. Mill's critique of utilitarianism is exemplary of the manner in which the democratic postulate soon became an integral part of the theory of liberal democracy and its emphasis on the need for respect for individuals as human beings.

The ideal of maximizing human powers was supposed to counterbalance the older assumption that individuals are maximizers of their utilities. According to Macpherson, the attempt democratically to amend and to transform liberalism has been wholly unsuccessful, and it must remain so, because it supposes the possibility of reconciling what cannot, in fact, be reconciled. Under market capitalism conditions, life cannot be lived fully by individuals who are considered as equals so long as they devote themselves to the acquisition of utilities and, consequently, to denying effectively the equal right of individuals to make the best of themselves.

Finally, in his book *Property*, Macpherson analyzed this central difficulty with specific reference to the property question. The individual right to private property—which liberal theory has inferred from the nature of the species—was seen to be overly narrow and in need of broadening, exactly because it contradicts the liberal assertion that all individuals are naturally free and equal. Guided by the precept that property is not a thing in itself, and that it is always subject to transformations of form and meaning, Macpherson argued for a new property paradigm. The argument drew upon, and considerably amended, Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. Property, although it must always be an individual right, need not be confined to a negative right to exclude others from the use, benefit, or disposal of the fruits of labor and/or of the means of life. To suppose that property is a natural right to prohibit others from what one commands or produces—property as exclusively *meum* and *tuum*—is to be seduced by liberalism. It is to assume, falsely, that the denial of the humanity of others—who are without property in land or capital, and must therefore alienate their labor—is somehow natural.

Yet property, Macpherson continued, may equally be considered as an individual right not to be excluded by others from the use, benefit, or disposal of the means of life and the fruits of labor. When property is understood in this positive sense, the problem of liberal democratic theory is no longer one of infringing, narrowing, or putting absolute limits on the individual property right. It is rather a problem of supplementing the individual right to exclude others—a right that would persist, say, in the form of consumables, such as toothbrushes (one of Macpherson's favorite examples), which can be enjoyed only as exclusive property—with common property, the individual positive right not to be excluded by others. Property in land, capital, labor, and the consumable means of life is a right required by all to enable them to express their human essence. The right not to be excluded by others to the means of life is a necessary condition of the right of all to full human development. Through this reasoning, Macpherson envisaged not the abolition of the right of property, but rather the generalization of property ownership into a form of "autogestion" which ensures, for all members of society, the ability to dispose of the social forces of production and to enjoy the fruits of productive activity. Macpherson always regarded this positive right to property as not only preferable, but as actually required by the liberal/democratic ethic of individuals as creative actors. Democratic control over the uses to which the amassed capital of society is put would not destroy, but in fact emancipate, the liberal/democratic vision from its self-destructive, half-democratic premises.

**POSTLIBERAL DEMOCRACY**

Although Macpherson's vision of postliberal democracy as the maximization of human powers is only briefly sketched here, its chief strengths should be apparent. It powerfully called into question the postwar class compromise secured by the Keynesian welfare state. It demonstrated the implausibility of the free market case against the welfare state. Macpherson's vision challenged the consensus that democracy equals the rule of political elites. It drew attention to the vital importance of thinking historically about democracy, and, by emphasizing the ways in which the distribution of social and political power is conditioned by property relations, it pointed to a muddle within liberal/democratic theory. In each respect, Macpherson's vision proved to be a fertile utopia. Yet it is also possible to discern several serious weaknesses within his defense of a postliberal democracy. Although these difficulties within Macpherson's otherwise fruitful approach are not immediately obvious, they are of profound importance to anyone concerned with the future of democracy. These difficulties include the failure of Macpherson's democratic humanism to come to terms with ethical pluralism, his attraction to the
myth of collective harmony and the abolition of the state, and his excessive trust in modern scientific-technical progress. These problems are analyzed further in this chapter. In each case Macpherson's arguments are employed in order to demonstrate their internal limits—that is, what they have excluded or concealed from discussion.

ETHICAL PLURALISM

To begin with, questions must be raised about Macpherson's argument that democracy is equivalent to the humanization of the world. His humanism supposes that democracy is not merely a set of procedures, but a normatively structured way of life. It also supposes that qualitative distinctions between good and bad are possible—that being human is a defensible good.

As I have shown, Macpherson attempted to stimulate the democratic imagination by celebrating the principle of “the free development of human capacities.” This principle rests on the surprising assumption that competing or contradictory validity claims are not of the essence of being human. It is as if democratic humanism is a privileged form of life that is incontrovertible and hence insulated against political controversy.

Consider Macpherson's discussion of the possibilities of maximizing democracy. Here individuals' human attributes were taken to include the capacities for rational understanding; moral judgment and action; aesthetic creation or contemplation; and emotional activities of friendship, love, and, sometimes, religious experience. A cascade of questions concerning the criteria of validity of these human attributes is prompted by this list:

- Are there not diverse forms of rationality and, if so, are they all equally human?
- Are there not different types of moral judgments and action and different forms of aesthetic creation and contemplation?
- Which particular religious experiences should be counted as essentially human?

Even if convincing and binding responses could be given to such questions, could we assume that these different human attributes are compatible with each other—Presbyterianism with Marxism-Leninism, gay and lesbian politics with Islam, and feminism with trade unionism? In short, as Max Weber asked: Are these gods sometimes not at war with each other and, if that is the case, which of them should we serve?

Macpherson would have rejected this line of questioning as an example of rational-calculating thinking, as the type of market reasoning that converts and downgrades all human values and forms of life into self-interested, greedy behavior. From this perspective, the very possibility of democratic emancipation depends upon warding off market irrationalism by forming the correct conception of the very essence of morality: that is, being human. Only with that could democracy be secured against the antidemocratic assumption that any belief, including those avowedly hostile to humanity, is as good as any other.

This conclusion is unwarranted. Philosophical questions about the diversity and potential incommensurability of normatively structured forms of life are among the most pressing frontier problems of contemporary democratic theory. Paradoxically, Macpherson's efforts to justify the vision of a democratic society which maximizes the "uniquely human capacities" of individuals brings this problem of ethical diversity and conflict into sharper focus. His assumption that democracy—the free exercise of subjects' humanity—is obviously preferable to heteronomy reveals that this preference is far from obvious, and that the justification (and possible redefinition) of democracy therefore requires further and more careful philosophical consideration.

The need to reconsider the political implications of ethical pluralism is, of course, peculiar to modern societies, as de Tocqueville and others first suggested. Under modern conditions, the search for objective ethical truth—for rules which determine, once and for all, how rational agreement can be secured among forms of life that evidently are in conflict—has been both singularly unsuccessful and (as in the extreme cases of Stalinism and Nazism) politically destructive. Modern societies severely weaken the power of norms referring to cultural tradition or to a natural order of things. Consequently, they begin self-consciously to summon up their normative identities from within themselves. Modernization processes terminate the natural determination of ethics. In destroying the old reference points of ultimate certainty, modern social actors begin to sense that they are not in possession of any ultimates based on knowledge, conviction, or faith, and that they are continually and forever obliged to define for themselves how and why they wish to live. It becomes evident to these actors that theirs is a society marked by ethical indeterminacy. They sense that the so-called ultimate ends do
not correspond to an immutable and "real" origin or essence, and that these normative goals are therefore always subject to debate, conflict, and resistance—and, hence, to temporal and spatial variation. Actors within modern societies discover, even if intuitively, that the processes of creating, developing, and implementing norms can be analyzed only through a theory of ethical pluralism that understands that norms come to appear as ultimate or grounded only insofar as they are conventionally differentiated from, and come to predominate over, other and different norms. Ethical standards, from this perspective, are seen not as positive and fixed entities in themselves, but as the product of a system of practically established, contingent, and therefore highly precarious differences and similarities among individuals, groups, movements, and institutions of various kinds.

The more that modern societies liquidate the assumption that ethical standards have an essential or ultimate basis, the more a theory of ethical pluralism is required to make sense of the political processes of contestation and alliance through which normative standards are established, transformed, or undone.Emphasizing the radical indeterminacy and possible incommensurability of these standards, a theory of ethical pluralism suggests, contrary to Macpherson, how a theory of democracy can do without a standpoint of humanism, which is itself defined as "essential" and closed to further questioning.

As I have argued against Lyotard and Habermas, there is an intimate relationship between ethical pluralism and democracy. The theory of ethical pluralism, itself not a metatheory based on First Principles, rejects all forms of power and politics which are hell-bent on stifling this indeterminacy and pluralism by demanding the general adoption of particular forms of life that have been clothed in the familiar repertoire of metaphors, such as that every woman needs a man just as the herd needs the shepherd, the ship's crew a captain, and the proletariat the Party; that the end justifies the means; that doctors know best; that the end justifies the means; that doctors know best; that every belief about every matter is as good as every other.

This connection can be clarified by asking after the presuppositions of ethical pluralism—that is, by reflecting counterfactually upon the theoretical and sociopolitical conditions necessary for its institutionalism as such. Consider the following line of reasoning.

The pluralist thesis that ethical values may be incommensurable, and that they are intelligible and interpretable only in terms of their difference from, or similarity with, other values and their criteria of adequacy implies an opposition to all claims and institutional contexts which thwart or deny this pluralist thesis. That is to say, a self-consistent pluralism is compelled to devote itself to the theoretical and political project of questioning and disarticulating all absolutist or ideological truth claims. That means, for example, that ethical pluralism cannot rest content with prepolitical assertions about the need for supporting our culture conversationally, through the telling of stories. It also means that it cannot cling naïvely to the melancholic, complacent, or cynical views often associated with various forms of ethical relativism: that every belief about every matter is as good as every other.

Pluralism implies the need for institutional arrangements that guarantee that advocates of similar or different forms of life can openly and continuously articulate their respective norms. At the least, it implies a civil society comprising a plurality of interdependent, self-organizing social institutions. This further implies the need for political mechanisms of conflict resolution and compromise that limit and reduce the serious antagonisms that frequently issue from struggle among incompatible forms of social life. The pluralist insistence upon the diversity and incompatibility of the structure, styles of reasoning, and substantive content of life-forms also supposes—and this point is fundamental—the need for democratic procedures which guarantee openness within and between state institutions and civil society and, therefore, ensure that individuals and groups can fairly defend their particular norms in relation to other, possibly incompatible, norms.

This line of argument, which is so near and yet so far from Macpherson's democratic humanism, suggests that democracy is an implied condition of the ethical pluralism initiated by processes of modernization. To embrace ethical pluralism is to anticipate, and to support the establishment of, a civil society and publicly accountable state institutions, within which individuals and groups can openly express their agreement with (or their opposition to) others' ideals. In this sense, democracy can no longer be understood, as Macpherson sought to understand it, as a substantive norm, or as a type of heteronomous principle which can be foisted upon social and political actors. Democracy is better understood in terms of procedures which have normative implications. Democracy comprises a system of procedural rules that specify who is authorized to make collective decisions and by which institutional means such decisions are to be made. In contrast to all forms of heteronomous government, democracy comprises procedures for reaching collective decisions by means of the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation of interested parties and their
represents. Understood in this way, democracy cannot be interpreted as merely one procedural condition among others, as if groups struggling to defend or to realize their ideals could decide legitimately to play by democratic rules for a time, only later to abandon them. Their rejection of democracy would evidently contradict the particular and contingent character of their ideals. Their proclaimed universalism would cover up the wholly conventional social and political processes of conflict and solidarity through which all particular ethical ideals are established, maintained, and transformed.

From this pluralist perspective, finally, democracy can no longer be viewed as a synonym for the withering away of social division and political conflict, as Macpherson's theory of the nonopposition of essential human capacities encouraged us to do. The foundations of fully democratic societies are permanently unstable. The well-known adage that democracy is a tedious process derives from this fact. Democratic procedures are rarely taken for granted, and decisions taken by means of these procedures are rarely accepted fully, as if power struggles and controversies about means and ends, techniques and ethics, could be resolved once and for all. Consequently, under democratic conditions reliance on the faculty of judgment is indispensable. A democratic society cannot flatter itself on its capacity to know and to subsume everything under hard and fast general rules. Its members understand the need to be sensitive to particulars and to avoid moralizing categorical imperatives. They also know that they cannot rely upon universally applicable rules and methods, and consequently they appreciate their own ignorance, which is to say—compare the Socratic attitude—that they know that they cannot know everything. To defend democracy in this sense is, therefore, to recognize the power of indeterminacy, controversy, and uncertainty. It is to be prepared for conflict, for the appearance of the unexpected, and for the constant probability of novelty.

THE ABOLITION OF THE STATE?

Macpherson's tendency to suppress the problems of uncertainty, diversity, and conflict is related to, and strengthened by, his fascination with the nineteenth-century goal of abolishing state institutions. I have observed already that Macpherson attempted to criticize liberal justifications of market-capitalist society and its class divisions by, at the same time, retrieving, reconstructing, and affirming the liberal notion of individual self-development. What is curious about this affirmative critique is that it takes little or no account of the specifically political and legal dimensions of the liberal/democratic tradition—including its theories of social contract and arguments about self-determined political obligation and consent; its theories of a free press, minority rights, majority rule, and formal and universal law; and its important emphasis on the division between the state and civil society.

Macpherson's silence about such issues is reminiscent of the young Karl Marx's counterdeclaration of civil and political rights in Zur Judenfrage and is especially evident in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. It is true that this work contains rare passages where Macpherson acknowledged that the classical liberal concepts of justice, obligation, rights, and freedom are not fully reducible to the liberal defense of market exchanges between proprietors conceived as possessive individuals. This caveat usually remained unheeded. The state, or political society, was normally conceived by Macpherson as a mechanism for maximizing the security of the property-owning classes. For example, the differences between Hobbes's defense of a self-perpetuating sovereign state and Locke's defense of a more limited constitutional state were explained by referring to the growth of class cohesion within the emergent market society. In each case, political and legal procedures were viewed as mere engines for guaranteeing property, understood as saleable absolute rights to things. Macpherson also claimed that the English Levellers (consistent with their petit-bourgeois class position) identified freedom with property—an interpretation that underestimated the extent to which their broad concept of "propriety," which was common in seventeenth-century political discourse in England, covered not only rights to life and estate, but also to liberty from state tyranny.

The reductionism of Macpherson's account of liberalism was further evident in his conflation of the important differences between classical liberalism and utilitarianism, the latter being understood as only a restatement of the individualist principles worked out during the seventeenth century. The thesis that "Bentham built on Hobbes" is repeated in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy; in which the analysis of liberal democracy commences with utilitarianism, as if, say, the explicit rejection of the natural rights and social contract doctrines by Bentham and James Mill were of little consequence for democratic theory.

By concentrating on the market at the expense of the specifically political and legal concerns of classical liberalism—seeing them as appendages or functional requirements of a civil society dominated by
commodity production and exchange—Macpherson's understanding of modern civil societies and states was overly narrow. It downgraded the important distinction between civil society and the state because it tended to reduce the state to a political organ of the property-owning classes, especially the bourgeoisie. On that basis, it further conflated the complex patterns of group organization, stratification, and the conflicts and movements of civil society to the logic and contradictions of a mode of production—the market-capitalist economy. The importance for democratic theory of other institutions of civil society—households, prisons, voluntary associations, hospitals, scientific and literary clubs, and churches—was thereby devalued. Macpherson's inability to come to terms theoretically with feminist concerns in *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* was symptomatic of this difficulty. He supposed, unconvincingly, that the fate of households and other institutions of modern civil society is tied to the overwhelming power of the market.

Macpherson also underestimated the extent to which liberal justifications of the market were not identical with early liberal arguments for and against the power of the modern constitutional state. Liberal discourse from the time of the English Civil War until the abortive revolutions of 1848 did not merely seek to make the world safe for a capitalist system that permitted no other criterion of individuals' worth than that of market freedom, as Macpherson and his teacher Harold Laski supposed. Early liberal political philosophy was also preoccupied with two fundamental problems: apportioning and controlling the exercise of political power, and reconciling the freedom of different individuals, groups, and classes with political order and coercion. Typically, the state was seen as a product of reason, as an institution which collectively restrains private interests and passions, and thereby secures a controlled and ordered liberty in the face of possible exercises of pure strength and/or disorder and chaos. Political reason is *raison d'État*. It served to justify an entirely new apparatus of anonymous power—the modern bureaucratic state—in which the monopoly of the weapons of violence is reinforced by means of collecting taxes, conducting foreign policy, articulating and administering law, and policing its subjects. The function of the state is to provide a secure foundation upon which patriarchal family life, as well as domestic and international trade and commerce, could flourish.

Most early modern liberal thinkers understood that the market economy emerged under the shadow of the modern bureaucratic state. They also saw that the unconditional recognition of its sovereign power could—and frequently did—result in the deprivation of the powers of its male, property-owning subjects. Consequently, while early liberal thinkers sought to justify the centralizing state as necessary, they attempted at the same time to justify limits upon its potentially coercive powers. Although blind to certain forms of power (such as markets, patriarchal households, and disciplinary institutions), these liberal thinkers displayed—certainly when compared with our times—a very deep sensitivity to questions concerning power, legitimacy, and obligation. In other words, the history of liberal political thought from the midseventeenth until the midnineteenth centuries is the history of attempts to justify might and right, political power and the rule of law, and the duties of subjects and the entitlements of citizens.

Macpherson's imaginative defense of democracy can perhaps be excused on these finer points of interpretation. But his truncated understanding of modern civil societies and the political and legal dimensions of liberalism produced a deep ambiguity within his writings about the appropriate role of political institutions in democratic societies. In fact, his discussion of democracy vacillated between two extreme and diametrically opposed (but symbiotically connected) possibilities: a deep trust in state power and a belief in the fiction of the withering away of the state.

Consider Macpherson's statism, his insistence upon the duties owed by subjects to sovereign state power. There are several examples, of which one is his comments on the former state socialist regimes. In the context of a discussion of whether the state apparatuses of these regimes could be described as democratic—if, by democracy, we mean a publicly accountable system of political, legal, and military institutions—Macpherson answered in the negative. Yet, Macpherson continued, if these societies are understood as transitional regimes, as in motion toward democracy in the sense of "a kind of society," a form of society without class divisions and orientated to the free development of human capacities, then they can indeed be described as democratic. The most striking instance of Macpherson's unintended statism is to be found in the concluding pages of *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. There he argued that a theory of political obligation that does not rely upon naturalistic, divine, or external standards of legitimacy can be valid only if it can point to a fundamental equality among all individuals, a shared equality that, in turn, can serve as the basis of their self-obligation to political power. In his view, liberal-democratic theory can no longer rely on the assumption that everyone is subject to the determining laws
of a competitive market, the inevitability of which has been challenged increasingly during the past century by the enfranchisement and militancy of the industrialist working class.

Is a new concept of fundamental equality at all conceivable? Macpherson answered affirmatively by pointing to a new development: the possibility of global nuclear war which, in his view, has created "a new equality of security among individuals, not merely within one nation but everywhere." Hobbes's depiction of the state of nature—in which life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short—is now a more frightening and actual possibility than Hobbes could ever have imagined. This global insecurity makes possible a new rational political obligation to a wider political authority.

Macpherson was correct, of course, about the unparalleled catastrophe implicit within a world bristling with nuclear arms. But by appealing to global insecurity as the condition of political obligation and obedience, his arguments lost contact with the democratic principles of self-assumed obligation and the restriction of state power. Fear is never the basis of democratic solidarity. It is its antithesis. Fear of losing power corrupts those who exercise it, just as it corrupts those who are subject to power. Fear also has a nasty habit of displacing itself onto overbearing personalities, parties, and institutions. As Hobbes himself acknowledged, the act of voluntary contract outlined in the Leviathan is highly involuntary, because it takes place under the threat of death. Moreover, as an act of mutual consent, it is the first and final contract because it is synonymous with the institution of a new political entity—a sovereign power—that can be resisted legitimately only under exceptional circumstances. It is a type of political authority before which, as Hobbes said, all subjects are little more than small stars in the presence of an overpowering sun.

Elsewhere, Macpherson's statism was jettisoned in favor of the opposite, but equally implausible, vision of the abolition of the state. From the time of his survey of political radicalism in Alberta, he was tempted by the chiliastic belief in a transparent, self-regulating social order, a democratic society marked only by rational harmony and near-perfect freedom and equality among creatively interacting individuals. This belief followed directly from Macpherson's tendency to reduce all political problems to issues of property, and also by his reliance on what he described as the staggering postulate, which I have criticized above, of the nonopposition of essentially human capacities. Macpherson always emphasized that democratic theory must recognize that human rights and freedoms are not mutually destructive. If freed from scarcity, individuals could live together harmoniously. Whatever tensions remained would be creative and noncontradictory tensions. They would form part of a process in which an individual's essentially human capacities could be exercised without hindering the use and development of other individual's human capacities. Fully humanized individuals could transform themselves self-consciously by codetermining their relations with other individuals and their material environment, without conflict and troubled by second thoughts and unforeseen consequences. Individuals in motion would be reconciled with each other and with themselves.

In relying upon this postulate, Macpherson allied himself with the tradition of expressivist thinking which is traceable to eighteenth-century romanticism, to Humboldt and Schiller, Sturm und Drang. Herder, the young Marx, and J.S. Mill. Expressivism sustained itself upon a deinstitutionalized notion of freedom, and in this respect it can be seen as an attempted rebellion against the uniquely modern institutional division between state institutions and civil society. Individuals are seen to develop and externalize their subjectivity in peaceful cooperation with others. Individuals are the process of harmonious self-creation.

Macpherson's reliance upon this model of expressivism and its belief in collective harmony is problematic. His theory of democracy yearned for a perfectly substantive democracy, unhindered by procedural matters. It supposed that on the democratic Isles of Humanity there will be no foxes who trick cows, and that lions will be moved to lie down with lambs. In this democratic paradise, individuals would, at all times, be "for themselves." Their identity would be fused together organically. By expressing their humanity freely, individuals would at the same time express the humanity of the whole collectivity. The individual and the political community would become a fully realized unity.

Contemporary democratic theory must reject this mode of expressivism as an unrealizable daydream that, paradoxically, looks considerably less radical than the old liberal formulations it sought to replace. To suppose the possibility of collective harmony is to ignore the obvious reasons why state institutions cannot wither away. It is also to what expectations about the need for collective harmony, thereby encouraging (often unintentionally) the growth of authoritarian measures designed to eradicate disagreement and to enforce collective harmony. To envisage collective harmony is also to ignore the perennial need for mechanisms—such as the separation of state and social powers—that...
prevent the concentration and abuse of power. Finally, the supposition of collective harmony discourages consideration of the following kinds of questions about the institutional preconditions of democracy:

1. Assuming, with Macpherson, the absence of large-scale systems of privately owned property, what would be the appropriate role and scope of state, cooperative, and individual forms of property?

2. Would there be a role for market mechanisms—a question ruled out a priori by Macpherson's identification of "the market" with capitalism and possessive individualism—and, if so, how could their negative effects be controlled without instituting new forms of bureaucratic administration?

3. Would producers be free to choose their forms of work activity and to retrain themselves?

4. Would a citizen's basic income be provided unconditionally to all adult citizens?

Macpherson's postulate of the nonopposition of essentially human capacities rules out these important types of questions for democrats. It rests on the misleading assumption that the transition to democracy could take the form of a leap into the realm of freedom untroubled by problems of complexity and controversies over procedural rules. It presupposes, unrealistically, that democratic humanity would become generic humanity, cheerfully and harmoniously united in a world of pure self-government.

TECHNOLOGY AND SCARCITY

Macpherson's counterargument against this type of criticism is that actual or projected technological developments within mature capitalist societies require, and make possible, a postscarcity form of democracy in which, at long last, it would be feasible to discard the market concept of humanity as a mere aggregate of acquisitive, contentious individuals driven by "numberless wants" (Hume). According to Macpherson, scarcity was for millennia the universal human condition. He denied the insight, developed in recent anthropology, that societies of plenty existed prior to modernity. According to Macpherson, there has always been scarcity, and until the rise of modern capitalism it had been generally assumed to be a permanent and irreversible phenomenon. However, three centuries ago, with the advent of market capitalism, the phenomenon of scarcity underwent a profound transformation of meaning. Liberal societies invented a new view of scarcity, supposing that the permanent condition of humanity is a condition of scarcity in relation to unlimited desires, both innate and acquired. Certainly, before the emergence of liberal market society, nobody assumed that unlimited desire was the natural and proper attribute of the human being. It is not to be found in the writings of Aristotle or Aquinas, Macpherson pointed out. The view that satisfactions are permanently scarce, because they are relative to infinite desire, appears only during seventeenth-century capitalist society. This decisive change is expressed in the writings of Hobbes and Locke. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is carried to its logical conclusion by James Mill, for whom the "grand covering law of human nature" was the insatiable desire of all individuals for power to render the persons and properties of others subservient to their pleasures. Paradoxically, then, the concept of scarcity came to predominate only as capitalist society set about overcoming it. Scarcity was manufactured by the very process of organizing to abolish it.

In the present period, Macpherson claimed, King Scarcity can be deposed. He directly contested Keynes's view that we must remain trapped in the dark tunnel of economic necessity for at least another century, relying in the meantime upon economic growth to bring us into the daylight of abundance and freedom at the end of this tunnel. The extraordinary development of the contemporary productive forces—what Macpherson called "the technological revolution"—is a positive (if self-contradictory) process because it contains the potential to undermine the rationale for unlimited freedom of acquisition. Macpherson, no doubt, recognized that the technological multiplication of productivity forms part of a corporate strategy of producing new quantities of desires, and that this threatens the democratic potential of the technological revolution. But the rejection of market morality and its false assumption that individuals are infinite consumers and appropriators nowadays becomes logically as well as technically possible. Unwittingly, the technological revolution—the discovery and application of new means of communication and energy production are just two examples—aids the goal of a revolution in democratic consciousness.

This brief summary of Macpherson's observations on scarcity should suffice to indicate that they fell squarely within the tradition of those progressives who trust in the development of the modern forces of production, and who criticize the capitalist mode of production only for
its failed potential to abolish material scarcity and to facilitate the dismantling of all relationships of arbitrary rule and blind obedience. This position underpinned the old communist belief in capitalistic production as a potential basis for socialism—Fordism without Ford, in Trotsky's version—and today informs proposals, championed by some industrialists, technocrats, and state planners, to adopt nuclear power democratically and for peaceful ends. The most forceful version of this thesis is the classical Marxian thesis concerning the fettering of the forces of production by capitalist relations of production. Macpherson's formulations closely resemble this thesis. According to both Marx and Macpherson, it is not modern science, machinery, or technical methods which overwork and enslave their producers. Pauperization or (as Macpherson would have said) dehumanization is, rather, the consequence of the mode of social and political relations of power within which the nonliving forces of production are embedded. From this standpoint, the potential of the mature forces of production serves as a critical measure of the immaturity of the existing class-dominated relations of production. In capitalist society, the scientific-technical forces of production—the accumulated products of social labor—represent a historical triumph of the producing species over outer nature. The existing stock of science, machinery, and techniques of producing contains the potential to reduce radically the unfreedom of the working day and to increase the democratically associated producers' wealth and freedom. Released from compulsory labor, and no longer preoccupied with labor as a necessary means of acquiring commodities, individuals could think and act as enjoyers and developers of their human capacities.

Macpherson's claim about the political innocence of the capitalist forces of production—his assumption that actors could democratically take over and dispose freely of the productive forces they inherit—is questionable in several respects. Macpherson insisted that nonownership of property—the lack of free access to "materials to work on or work with"—is the chief external impediment to democratic individuation. Yet he never considered the ways in which the restriction of nonowners' powers was an organizing principle of the Fordist phase of industrial production during which he wrote. The bureaucratic structuring of scientific research and development, and public and private sector attempts to subject the labor process to the principles of Taylorism, illustrate how, despite workers' pressure from below, the material forces of production are often the medium and outcome of the managerial will to control and to manipulate employees, who are regarded as just another badly designed machine in need of constant repair or replacement. The extent to which this process of subordination could be undone by the present growth of flexible specialization and the disintegration of the old technological paradigm based on the assembly line system and continuous flow industries, remains unclear.35

Unfortunately, Macpherson's account of science, technology, and the labor process is of little help in clarifying this trend. Its trust in the productive forces—in what Macpherson called "the technological advances made by capitalism"—is too deep.36 It simply assumes that democracy and technology can advance hand in hand. Moreover, that unexplained assumption suggests why Macpherson's argument fails to consider the anguishing possibility that the democratization of certain types of socially necessary work might be unwise if the overall political goal is to maximize individuals' freedom from the exigencies of production and consumption. It is true that the production of, say, telephones, buses, bicycles, or computers could be democratized, that is, subjected to decisions of the members or representatives of producer and consumer groups equipped with the latest means of circulating information. However, the reliance on democratic procedures in the production process might sometimes be inefficient and time-consuming. In order to shorten radically the quantity of time given over to socially necessary work—a condition of democracy in Macpherson's sense—these forms of production might be better organized within large-scale, centrally administered institutions. In that case, technology and democracy would come into conflict. The scope of democratic participation would need to be limited in certain spheres in order to maximize democratic participation elsewhere.37

These difficulties in Macpherson's theory of democracy and technology are compounded by his argument that scarcity can be fully overcome. When reading Macpherson, one is struck by his frequent allusions to the adage which Marx appropriated from St. Simon: in democratic society, the maxim "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" will finally prevail. The belief that all individuals could receive according to their own particular and general needs led Macpherson to anticipate a society of plenitude, a fairy-tale world of luxury and abundance in which each member of society will have open access to the legendary magic table that caters to each of their culinary wishes. After exerting their uniquely human capacities, individuals would need only to say, "Table, set thyself" in order to be served a sumptuous and satisfying meal.
Macpherson's belief in the possibility of material abundance corresponds to the early modern idea of uninterrupted progress in the mastery and domination of outer nature. Today, this idea is obsolete for several reasons. For a start, Macpherson's formulations eclipse the problem of defining distributive justice and the institutional conditions necessary for its ongoing realization. The problem of who gets what, when, and how appears to wither away in Macpherson's democratic society. Material scarcity and satisfaction are presented as determinate states of being. Liberated from scarcity and basking in a sunny world of material plenitude, individuals could thus develop their human capacities freely, that is, without external hindrance. Macpherson's secret affinity with Marx resurfaces in this formulation. Given material abundance, it is argued, each and every individual would be able to satisfy his or her material needs without disagreements, disputes, or hand-to-hand struggles. This vision is dangerous and impossible, because—to repeat an earlier point—it is shaped by the unworkable myth of a future democratic society marked by the immediate reconciliation of all with each and of each with him- or herself. Undoubtedly, Macpherson refused to think of human needs as naturally given. Needs have an inescapable historical character. They are always defined and contested by social actors within a given temporal and spatial framework. But if needs are subject to fluctuation through time and space, and if the vision of free individuals living contentedly in harmony is thereby mythical, then questions about distributive justice can never be suppressed. Whatever the state of the productive forces, there will always be controversies about how, when, and where to divide the divisible. The likelihood of such controversies also implies the need for institutional procedures—within and between state institutions and civil society—for democratically expressing and equitably resolving them.

Macpherson's embrace of the idea of infinite progress in the mastery of nature is suspect for another reason. He supposed that the submission of nature to human domination is a condition of the democratization of humanity. The highest ethic of democracy might be summarized thus: Treat individuals as human beings, that is, as self-moving ends in themselves—and nature as a thing, as the raw material or means of human self-realization. Today serious doubts about the anthropocentrism of this ethic are emerging. There is evidence that nature's enforced submission to human powers of technological control is stimulating nature's revenge on humanity. Anxiety about the effects of environmental waste and degradation on human life in the next century is growing.
concerned with future effects, which are, by definition, not yet knowable.

For these various reasons, estimates of environmental impact and acceptable limits of waste will always remain controversial. Sustainability cannot serve as an incontrovertible principle or Archimedean point upon which to base a postindustrial politics. Sustainability certainly cannot be guaranteed automatically by such institutional mechanisms as centralized state planning, social ownership, scientific expertise, the market, or (as some Green activists claim) small-scale organization and natural living. Both the scale and complexity of present-day environmental problems and the difficult task of shifting to sustainable patterns of growth confront us with massive risks. The production, distribution, and definition of environmental risks are now for the first time becoming problematic on a global scale. Contrary to Macpherson, it is not only the threat of nuclear war which has rendered us all equal. Smog, water pollution, and radiation are equally leveling in their effects. Risks are neither geographically nor sociologically limited. They crisscross national boundaries and boomerang on rich and poor, the powerful and less powerful alike. They tend to devalue the economic and aesthetic value of property, as the death of entire forests shows. Many of the new environmental risks—from poisonous additives in foodstuffs to nuclear and chemical contaminants—are also invisible, in the sense that they elude human perception and, in certain cases, are detectible only in the offspring of those who are currently affected. The growing quantity of these environmental risks suggests that we are in the midst of a massive, long-term experiment with ourselves and our biospheric environment, and that our productive powers are as awesome as the obligation to exercise them prudently.

Pressured by these environmental risks, democratic procedures today have a renewed and wholly novel pertinence. In the past, democracy was justified in various ways. There was the utilitarian claim that democratic mechanisms guarantee that the best interpreters of interests—the interested parties themselves—can sift through various options and decide for themselves. Others (including Macpherson) insisted that democracy is justified by its ability to maximize freedom in the sense of individual or group autonomy. Still others viewed democracy as superior because it is the strongest antidote to the abuse of power. Each of these conventional arguments is flawed, and new justifications of democracy are badly needed. The risk-based argument sketched here promises one such justification. It cuts across the grain of the conven-
tional argument that the most important feature of democratic procedures is that they enable the approval of decisions of interest to the whole collectivity, or at least to a majority of citizens. Instead, it suggests that democratic procedures also enable the public disapproval and revision of established agreements, and that for this reason they are uniquely suited to societies grappling with environmental risks. Democratic procedures are superior to all other types of decision making, not because they guarantee both a consensus and good decisions, but because they enable citizens who are affected by certain decisions to reconsider their judgments about the quality and consequences of these decisions. Democratic procedures increase the level of flexibility and reversibility of decision making. They encourage incremental learning and trial-and-error modification (or “muddling through”) and that is why they are best suited to the task of publicly monitoring, controlling, and sometimes shutting down complex and tightly coupled high-risk projects and organizations, the failure of which (as in Bhopal, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl) can have catastrophic ecological and social consequences.

Only democratic procedures can openly and fairly select certain types of dangers for public attention, carefully monitor them, and bring to heel those responsible for managing risky projects, thereby minimizing the possibility of error and reducing the chances of the big mistake. Democratic procedures are, for this reason, an essential corrective to the wishful belief in the therapeutic powers of unbridled technical expertise.Unchecked technocratic power, with its belief in the omnipotence and beneficence of scientific-technical progress, has been partly responsible for the rising incidence and severity of environmental problems. Current attempts by professional experts to monopolize the process of defining and reducing risks are therefore as implausible as the claim to infallibility of a pope who has recently converted to Protestantism. The belief in technocratic solutions is also dangerous, insofar as it can bolster the temptation to deal with environmental risks through dirigiste policies or by resorting to states of emergency. Democracy is an unrivalled remedy for technocratic delusions. It is an indispensable means of rendering accountable those politicians and entrepreneurs who turn a blind eye to the environmental damage and “normal accidents” (Perrow) that plague high-risk projects; and it renders accountable those professional experts who seek to define acceptable levels of risk by means of technical analyses of probability—or simply by falling back on the childish solipsism that whatever isn’t believed couldn’t possibly be harmful.
Unfortunately, Macpherson never pursued this unusual type of defense of democratic politics. Preferring to view democracy substantively, he clung to the neo-romantic notion that the peaceful emancipation of self-determining individuals is ethically and practically desirable. He therefore did not see that a great advance of democracy is that it is a type of decision-making procedure which enables its participants to monitor their own decisions. Democracy is a self-reflexive means of controlling the exercise of power. It is an indispensable weapon in the fight to question, restrict, and to dissolve arbitrary power, and for this reason a bad democracy is always better than a good dictatorship. That lesson is the unintended fruit of C. B. Macpherson's lifelong attempt to keep alive the democratic imagination. For provoking that insight, we should forever be grateful to him.

NOTES


6. See my "More Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Meaning and
In relation to modern contract theory and the theme of civil society and the state, I first argued this point in Public Life and Late Capitalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), essay 7. The general objection raised in this paragraph is summarized well by Norberto Bobbio, **Politics and cultura** (Torino: Il Mulino, 1955), 278: "It is simple to reject liberalism when it is identified with a theory or practice of freedom, understood as the power of the bourgeoisie. It is much more difficult, however, to reject liberalism when it is considered as the theory and practice of limiting the power of the state ... because freedom, understood as the power to do something, interests those fortunate enough to possess it, whereas freedom as the absence of restraint interests all humanity."


24. *RWD*, chap. 2; cf. DT, 35-36, where the "different notion of democracy" defended by state socialist regimes is viewed as part of "the increasingly democratic temper of the world as a whole."


27. *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), 245: "... the more homogeneous a society is, the less likely is the government to be regarded as a natural enemy. At the theoretical extreme of a society without class division, and with popular franchise, the people would regard the state's purposes as their own... Only in such a society is it possible to think of a general will sustaining a democracy without alternate parties."

28. DT, 54-55, 74.


31. DT, 25, 36-38.

32. See, for example, Alain Lipietz, *La croisade des chemins. Une alternative pour le XXIe siecle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); David Wolfe, *Politics in the Information Age* (forthcoming); Christopher Freeman, "Keynes or Kondratiev? How can...